Legislative responses to the foreclosure crisis in nonjudicial foreclosure states by Alexander, Frank S. et al.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Urban Studies Institute Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
2012
Legislative responses to the foreclosure crisis in
nonjudicial foreclosure states
Frank S. Alexander
Emory University, frank.alexander@emory.edu
Daniel Immergluck
Georgia State University, dimmergluck@gsu.edu
Katie Balthrop
katie.balthrop@troutman.com
Philip Schaeffing
Jesse Clark
jc@clarkpropconsulting.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/urban_studies_institute
Part of the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Urban Studies Institute by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alexander, F., Immergluck, D., Balthrop, K., Schaeffing, P. and Clark, J. (2012). Legislative responses to the foreclosure crisis in
nonjudicial foreclosure states. Review of Banking and Financial Law 31(1): 341-410.
2011-2012 RESPONSES TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 341 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE FORECLOSURE 
CRISIS IN NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE STATES 
 
FRANK S. ALEXANDER 
DAN IMMERGLUCK 
KATIE BALTHROP 
PHILIP SCHAEFFING 
JESSE CLARK∗ 
 
Introduction 
 
The foreclosure crisis of the early twenty-first century 
continues to defy simple solutions and predicted ending points. It 
began as a surge in subprime foreclosures in a limited number of 
weaker housing markets as early as 2004 and 2005 and was initially 
suppressed in many areas by rapidly rising home values. By the 
second half of 2006, however, home prices in most places had either 
flattened out or turned down, and foreclosures began to spike in more 
places, especially in metropolitan areas that had previously 
experienced rapid price appreciation fueled by subprime and exotic 
home loans.1 Vicious cycles set in quickly, and, within months, the 
sand states (Florida, Arizona, Nevada, and California) led the nation 
in foreclosure rates.2 In 2009, as unemployment continued to rise, the 
                                                            
∗ Frank S. Alexander is the Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory Law 
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1 Soo Youn, Market’s New Face: Home Prices Flatten, WASH. POST, Dec. 
14, 2006, at T1. 
2 Shayna M. Olesiuk & Kathy R. Kalser, The 2009 Economic Landscape, 
FDIC, 
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number of foreclosures of prime loans began to overtake the number 
of subprime foreclosures.3 This meant that in many cities the 
foreclosure problem spread both geographically and demographic-
ally. Although delinquency rates have generally stabilized, and in 
some places declined, serious delinquencies remain at historically 
high rates.4 With continuing weaknesses in most housing markets, 
the prospects for a substantial decline in foreclosures remain dim. 
This article focuses on the legislative responses to the fore-
closure crisis among states with nonjudicial foreclosure systems—
where mortgage foreclosures are conducted largely outside of the 
court system. The goal of this article is to identify efforts to modify 
or improve the single-family (one to four unit) residential foreclosure 
process—usually with the aim of reducing foreclosures—in response 
to the crisis and to identify states with more aggressive legislation. 
Because state policy in this area interacts heavily with federal efforts 
to reduce foreclosures, especially during the mortgage crisis, we first 
review federal foreclosure prevention initiatives, which began in 
earnest in 2007. In addition, changes to state law are not the only sort 
of measures that states can take, and because local responses can 
serve as important complements to state action, we also review 
examples of other, non-legislative forms of state and local efforts to 
reduce foreclosures. This is critical context for understanding the 
limits and advantages of legislative responses to rapidly rising 
foreclosures. After reviewing some recent literature on state 
foreclosure laws, we then analyze changes to state foreclosure laws 
in nonjudicial states from January 2005 through May 2010.5 After 
                                                            
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2009_vol3_1/AnatomyPerfec
tHousing.html (last updated Apr. 27, 2009). 
3 Diana Olick, It’s Prime Time in Foreclosures, CNBC, May 28, 2009, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/30984467/It_s_Prime_Time_In_Foreclosures. 
4 Serious Mortgage Delinquency Rates Stabilize in U.S. Metros, but Share 
of Loans in Foreclosure Grows, NATIONAL HOUSING CONFERENCE, Aug. 
16, 2011, http://www.nhc.org/media/August-2011-Foreclosure-Response-
Metro.html. 
5 Note that our data collection period ended prior to widespread media 
coverage of the problems involving fraudulent or missing foreclosure 
documentation and improper procedure, which began in the latter part of 
2010 and implicated many major loan servicers, including Bank of America. 
See, e.g., Jill Treanor & Julia Kollewe, Robo-Signing Eviction Scandal 
Rattles Wall Street, GUARDIAN, Oct. 14, 2010, at 32 (“Bank of America, JP 
Morgan and GMAC are among those to have halted foreclosures after 
discovering that ‘robo-signers’ had approved thousands of documents.”). 
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identifying states with relatively high levels of legislative activity in 
this area, we describe some of the more significant changes that 
occurred in some of these states. 
 
I. Nonjudicial vs. Judicial Foreclosure 
 
Each state is unique in its mortgage foreclosure system. In 
general, however, state foreclosure regimes tend to be classified as 
judicial or nonjudicial. In a judicial state, the foreclosure process 
goes through the court system. Lenders are typically required to give 
notice before filing the foreclosure complaint. After allowing the 
buyer time to respond to the notice, the complaint is served. If the 
borrower does not respond to the complaint, her case proceeds to a 
default judgment and the court authorizes a foreclosure sale. If a 
borrower files a response, the case goes to trial, resulting in a 
decision authorizing a foreclosure sale, or an order dismissing the 
complaint and forcing the lender to recommence the action at a 
future date.6 On the other hand, in the majority of states, where 
nonjudicial foreclosure is the predominant method, the lender 
typically only needs to send a notice of sale to the homeowner, place 
an advertisement in a local paper, and hire an auctioneer to sell the 
property.7 To stop a foreclosure sale in a nonjudicial state, the 
homeowner must file an affirmative court action.8 
                                                            
6 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5061 (2011) (providing for a judicial 
foreclosure process). 
7 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030(8) (2011) (requiring that written 
notice of default be transmitted to the borrower at least thirty days before 
notice of sale); id. § 61.24.031(1)(a) (providing for thirty days between 
initial contact with borrower and notice of default); id. § 61.24.040(3) 
(requiring that the notice of sale be published in a local newspaper). 
8 Borrowers may also file for bankruptcy to interrupt the foreclosure process 
by seeking an automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2006). The automatic 
stay is “one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the 
bankruptcy laws,” which “gives the debtor a breathing spell from his 
creditors,” permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, 
or simply allows the debtor to be relieved of the financial pressures that 
drove him or her into bankruptcy. 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. 
NORTON, III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 43:4 (3d ed. 
2010). The automatic stay process, however, can entail significant costs to 
the borrower, including those of a damaged credit record in some 
jurisdictions. See NANCY C. DREHER, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 7:10 
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A key difference between nonjudicial states and judicial 
states is that the foreclosure process tends to move more quickly in 
nonjudicial states, giving borrowers less time to respond to the 
foreclosure notice, obtain counseling or legal advice, seek a loan 
modification, or obtain another foreclosure alternative.9 One measure 
of the speed of the foreclosure process in a state is the total time 
required from the date of the initial notice of default or foreclosure to 
the date of the foreclosure auction or sale—what we call the 
minimum “notice-to-sale period.”10 This period typically begins with 
some sort of notice that the lender provides to the borrower that the 
loan is in default and that foreclosure may be pursued, or with an 
initial advertisement announcing the date of the pending foreclosure 
sale.11 Assuming a property goes through a foreclosure sale, the 
“notice-to-sale period” ends on the date of the foreclosure sale or 
auction. 
Nonjudicial foreclosure regimes are generally less friendly to 
the borrower and more advantageous to the lender than judicial 
regimes. They provide borrowers with substantially shorter notice 
periods and fewer opportunities to seek loan modifications or legal 
assistance. Moreover, states with nonjudicial systems tend to impose 
fewer duties on the part of the lender and place the burden on the 
                                                            
(5th ed. 2011) (explaining the split in authorities over whether a creditor’s 
reporting of a debtor’s prepetition debts violates the automatic stay). 
9 Compare Connecticut, a judicial foreclosure state with a notice-to-sale 
period of 157 days, with North Carolina, a nonjudicial foreclosure state with 
a notice-to-sale period of eighty-nine days. Amy Crews Cutts & William 
Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default: Policies and Practices to 
Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER 
AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 203, 233-36 (Nicholas Retsinas & Eric 
Belsky eds., 2008) (depicting state-by-state foreclosure statistics). 
10 The statutorily prescribed minimum notice-to-sale period may differ 
substantially from the actual time that a borrower is considered to be in the 
foreclosure process. In general, the latter will tend to be a longer period, 
especially when the foreclosure process slows down significantly as it has in 
many states since the foreclosure crisis began. See Tami Luhby, How to 
Rescue the Housing Market: Foreclosures!, CNNMONEY (Aug. 31, 2011, 
5:27 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/31/real_estate/housing_market_ 
foreclosures/index.htm (“[M]any mortgage servicers have slowed 
foreclosure efforts as they resolve shoddy paperwork practices.”). 
11 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030(8) (2011) (requiring that written 
notice of default must be transmitted to the borrower at least thirty days 
before notice of sale may be recorded). 
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borrower to slow or challenge the foreclosure process. Nonjudicial 
foreclosure regimes provide no structured opportunity for a borrower 
to have a judicial hearing to contest issues of default or the validity 
of a foreclosure.12 
The recently publicized problems with improper foreclosure 
procedures and fraudulent or missing documentation constitute a 
prime example of the advantages of a judicial foreclosure process to 
the borrower.13 The suspensions of foreclosure proceedings by large 
servicers that occurred in late 2010 began in judicial states only, 
having been prompted by court cases in those states.14 Such problems 
are very difficult to detect in most nonjudicial states because 
borrowers must generally initiate extraordinary interventions in the 
foreclosure process by filing suit to stop the regular foreclosure 
proceedings—a difficult and expensive process in most nonjudicial 
states. Moreover, because foreclosure law in nonjudicial states tends 
to include fewer borrower protections,15 the potential for success in 
the courtroom is often more limited, which also makes legal 
representation harder to obtain.  
Many of the recent, more substantive efforts to reduce 
foreclosures, including mediation programs, have been commonly 
                                                            
12 See Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation and Other Issues in 
Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. 
Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 7 (2010) 
(statement by Elizabeth Duke, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/ 
hearings/111/Duke111810.pdf (explaining the differences between the two 
types of regimes in waiting periods, notice requirements, methods of 
challenging foreclosure, etc.). 
13 See, e.g., Treanor & Kollewe, supra note 5 (reporting allegedly improper 
foreclosure procedures). 
14 See TIMOTHY MCKENNA & DR. CHUDOZIE OKONGWU, NERA ECON. 
COUNSELING, FORECLOSURE SUSPENSIONS AND OTHER MORTGAGE 
DISPUTES 3 (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_ 
Residential_Mortgage_Foreclosure_1210.pdf (asserting that all of the 
twenty-three states in which these suspensions have taken place allowed for 
a judicial foreclosure process, although three of them also allowed 
nonjudicial proceedings). 
15 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5061(a) (2011) (providing that the 
borrower may show cause, if there is any, why the mortgaged premises 
ought not to be seized and taken in execution for payment of the mortgage), 
with WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030(8) (2011) (requiring only that the lien 
holder provide the borrower with a notice of default and notice of sale). 
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found in judicial foreclosure states.16 There are at least two key 
reasons for this. First, the nonjudicial/judicial status of a state is itself 
an outcome of the state’s historical political environment. That is, 
states that tend to have stronger consumer protection laws and 
banking and finance regulations tend to have judicial foreclosure 
systems. However, this is not an ironclad relationship, as some 
nonjudicial states exhibit more rigorous consumer protection laws 
and lending regulations than some judicial states. On average, 
though, this correlation holds and is generally the result of 
differences in ideologies and balances of power in the legislative and 
executive branches across different states. Nonjudicial states often 
have state legislatures where it has been historically more difficult to 
pass strong foreclosure laws favoring borrowers. While some change 
might be expected in light of the foreclosure crisis, state legislative 
environments in this arena are unlikely to shift quickly.17 
A second reason why judicial states are more likely to 
initiate efforts to slow or reduce foreclosures is systematic inertia. 
That is, the judicial process fundamentally offers more time and 
opportunity for incremental interventions, such as mediation pro-
grams, than does the nonjudicial process, where such interventions 
are more difficult to design and implement without making major 
changes to the foreclosure process. One example is the issue of 
timing. Adding a mediation requirement to a foreclosure regime may 
lengthen the typical foreclosure process by a few weeks or months. 
                                                            
16 ANDREW JAKABOVICS & ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, IT’S 
TIME WE TALKED: MANDATORY MEDIATION IN THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS 
7 (2009) [hereinafter IT’S TIME WE TALKED], available at http:// 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/pdf/foreclosure_mediation.pdf. 
17 In response to the late 2010 media attention to foreclosure documentation 
and process problems, there have already been some proposals in 
nonjudicial states to switch to a judicial process. In Massachusetts, for 
example, the Secretary of State proposed a judicial foreclosure process in 
2010. Jenifer B. McKim, Bill Calls for Court OK to Foreclose, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2010, at 1; see generally H. 503, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. 
Sess. (Mass. 2011); S. 809, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011). In 
Virginia, Senator Don McEachin has introduced a bill calling for a 
transition to a judicial foreclosure process. S.B. 798, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(VA. 2010) (providing for a transition to a judicial foreclosure process after 
July 1, 2011). The bill provides that a court must order the sale of property 
subject to foreclosure for deeds of trust entered into on or after July 1, 2011; 
however, property secured by deeds of trust entered into prior to July 1, 
2011, may still be foreclosed upon using current nonjudicial procedures. Id. 
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In many nonjudicial states this would mean increasing the 
foreclosure notice period by 100% or more, while in many judicial 
states this would be a substantially smaller proportional increase in 
the overall foreclosure timeline.18 A second example is that the 
judicial process affords a borrower the opportunity to challenge not 
only the existence of an underlying default in payment of the debt, 
but also the opportunity to challenge the authority of the lender to 
initiate a foreclosure.19 Judicial authority and discretion create far 
greater latitude to respond to sudden changes. 
Figure 1 shows that judicial states tend to have substantially 
longer prescribed notice-to-sale periods than nonjudicial states. The 
bulk of judicial states have periods of over 100 days and a substantial 
number have periods over 200 days. Conversely, no nonjudicial 
states have prescribed notice-to-sale periods of over 200 days and 
most are under 100 days. 
                                                            
18 Compare New Mexico, a judicial foreclosure state with a notice-to-sale 
period of 155 days, with North Carolina, a nonjudicial foreclosure state with 
a notice-to-sale period of eighty-nine days. Adding a sixty-day mandatory 
mediation period to the New Mexico notice-to-sale period would increase 
the notice-to-sale period by over 38%, whereas adding a sixty-day 
mandatory mediation period to the North Carolina notice-to-sale period 
would increase the notice to sale period by 67%. Cutts & Merrill, supra note 
9, at 234 tbl. 7-7. 
19 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 5061(a) (2011) (providing that the borrower 
may show cause, if there is any, why the mortgaged premises ought not to 
be seized and taken in execution for payment of the mortgage). 
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lenders have the option—sometimes contingent on the nature of the 
loan or property—of utilizing either a judicial or nonjudicial 
foreclosure process.23 Depending on the state, choosing nonjudicial 
foreclosure may mean that the lender gives up some of its claims 
during or after the foreclosure process, such as the ability to pursue a 
deficiency judgment.24 In states where nonjudicial foreclosure is an 
option for residential, single-family foreclosures, most lenders tend 
to use the nonjudicial process when it is available. In all states, 
including the nonjudicial foreclosure states, a lender always has the 
option of pursuing foreclosure through a judicial process. 
Due to the particularities and variations in state foreclosure 
law, the distinction between “judicial” and “nonjudicial” states is not 
completely definitive and is subject to gray areas. For the purposes of 
this study, we chose to err on being over-inclusive when determining 
which states to classify as nonjudicial. As a result, we consider 33 
states and the District of Columbia as nonjudicial,25 leaving 17 states 
classified as judicial.26 
                                                            
23 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 60.10.020 (2011) (providing that any lien 
on certain personal property may be foreclosed by action in district court, 
superior court or summary action). 
24 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770(2) (2011) (providing that an action for 
deficiency may not be brought against the grantor after a nonjudicial or 
judicial foreclosure of a residential trust deed). A deficiency judgment, 
when it is allowed, occurs when the lender is not able to recover the full 
amount of the outstanding balance and fees by selling the foreclosed 
property. It allows the lender to pursue the borrower for the balance of the 
debt in excess of either the foreclosure sale price, or the fair market value of 
the property at the time of foreclosure. See WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12.070 
(“[T]he court shall direct in the decree of foreclosure that the balance due on 
the mortgage, and costs which may remain unsatisfied after the sale of the 
mortgaged premises, shall be satisfied from any property of the mortgage 
debtor . . . .”). 
25 The states that we classify as nonjudicial foreclosure states are Alabama, 
Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee,  Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. 
26 Our list is similar to that described in JOHN RAO & GEOFF WALSH, NAT. 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSING A DREAM: STATE LAWS DEPRIVE 
HOMEOWNERS OF BASIC PROTECTIONS 12 (2009) [hereinafter FORECLOSING 
A DREAM], available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_ 
mortgage/ 
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II. The Context for State Legislative Response: Federal Policy 
and State and Local Non-Legislative Actions  
 
Before examining state legislative efforts to reduce residen-
tial foreclosures during the latter half of the 2000s, it is important to 
consider the overall policy context for such legislative actions. For 
example, legislative efforts among states to slow the foreclosure 
process or lengthen the notice-to-sale period might have been less 
common if federal foreclosure prevention and loan modification 
programs had been more successful. Specifically, state efforts to 
reduce foreclosures might have been more successful if they were 
designed differently or if servicers were held more accountable for 
their loan modification services. 
 
A. Federal Policy Efforts to Reduce Foreclosures 
 
As the subprime crisis intensified in the spring of 2007, 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) Secretary Alphonso Jackson called for 
federal funding for foreclosure prevention counseling.27 In the fall, 
Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois introduced the Helping Families 
Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act, which would have allowed 
bankruptcy judges to modify the balance owed on owner-occupied 
home loans, an action called a “cramdown.”28 The Durbin bill would 
have provided direct relief to those filing for bankruptcy and given 
lenders and servicers an incentive to modify loans voluntarily before 
                                                            
state_laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf. However, our list is deliberately a 
bit more inclusive in favor of the nonjudicial category. The three additional 
states that we categorize as nonjudicial are Colorado, North Carolina and 
North Dakota. Colorado and North Carolina foreclosure processes have very 
minimal roles for the courts and essentially follow a nonjudicial process. 
North Dakota permits some residential mortgages to go through nonjudicial 
foreclosure but most go through a judicial process. 
27 Press Release, Joint Econ. Comm., Momentum Builds for JEC Chairman 
Schumer’s Call for Additional Federal Funds to Avert Subprime Fore-
closure Crisis (June 5, 2007), available at http://jec.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases (browse by “June 2007”; then follow the 
hyperlink dated “06/05/07”). 
28 Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S. 2136, 
110th Cong. § 101(a)(3) (as introduced by Sen. Richard Durbin, Oct. 3, 
2007). 
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the borrower filed for bankruptcy. Such a change would, in essence, 
have created maximum net present values for residential loans, a 
benchmark by which to measure loan modifications. Ultimately, 
however, industry lobbyists blocked the bill. 
At roughly the same time as Durbin introduced his bill, the 
Bush administration announced the Hope Now Alliance, which 
included lenders, industry groups and other organizations.29 The 
Alliance encouraged borrowers to call a 1-800 number to receive 
telephone credit counseling. In December 2007, while opposing 
continued calls for bankruptcy modification legislation, the Admini-
stration announced that it would promote “streamlined,” but volun-
tary, modifications for a subset of subprime mortgages.30The plan 
was developed in conjunction with the American Securitization 
Forum, a structured finance trade group.31Participation in the pro-
gram was voluntary in nature, however, and it suffered from various 
other problems which ultimately limited its impact.32 
In July of 2008, with foreclosures continuing to escalate, 
Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
(HERA).33 HERA was a complex bill that included the formation of 
                                                            
29 STEPHANIE CASEY PIERCE, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, EMERGING 
TRENDS: STATE ACTIONS TO TACKLE THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 9  
(2009), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/ 
0902FORECLOSUREREPORT.PDF.  
30 Bush Unveils Plan to Help Subprime Borrowers, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 6, 
2007, 4:19 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22132648/ns/business-
real_estate/t/bush-unveils-plan-help-subprime-borrowers/#.TqDJBd6InqE. 
31 See AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM, STREAMLINED FORECLOSURE 
AND LOSS AVOIDANCE FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITIZED SUBPRIME 
ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE LOANS 2 (2007), available at http://www. 
americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/FinalASFStatementonStreamline
dServicingProcedures.pdf (“We believe that applying the framework 
outlined in this Statement will streamline the loss mitigation efforts of 
servicers, and will maximize trust proceeds to investors as compared to the 
proceeds typically realized through foreclosure.”). 
32 Servicers and the Hope Now Alliance were under pressure to report large 
numbers of modifications, but Alan White found that only forty-seven 
percent of modifications resulted in reduced payments, and in thirty-five 
percent of cases payments actually increased. Alan M. White, Deleveraging 
the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage 
Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1116-17 (2009). 
33 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 
Stat. 2264 (2008).  
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a stronger regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,34 the 
authorization of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program,35 tax 
breaks for residential builders, a first-time homebuyer’s tax credit,36 
and other initiatives. The largest foreclosure prevention component 
in HERA was the $300 billion Hope for Homeowners program, 
commonly referred to as the “H4H” program.37 H4H was to be run 
by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to refinance distressed 
borrowers.38 As initially implemented, H4H required lenders to 
write-down existing mortgages and refinance borrowers into loans 
for not more than ninety percent of their homes’ current values.39 
However, the program was not designed to deal with the many 
borrowers that had second and sometimes third mortgages layered on 
top of their primary loans.40 Holders of junior loans were not inclined 
to agree to refinancings that would wipe out their interests. As a 
result of this and other problems, the program received only 312 
applications from across the entire country in its first two and one 
half months of operation.41 
                                                            
34 Id. § 1101. 
35 Id. § 2301. 
36 Id. § 3011. 
37 Id. § 1402. 
38 Id. §§ 1402, 257(b)(1). 
39 Id. §§ 1402, 257(e)(2)(B). 
40 For example, the proportion of senior mortgages with associated junior 
mortgages increased in Massachusetts from twenty six percent in 2003 to 
sixty-five percent in 2005. Eric S. Rosengren, President and CEO, Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Bos., Current Challenges in Housing and Home Loans: 
Complicating Factors and the Implications for Policymakers, Address at the 
New England Economic Partnership’s Spring Economic Outlook Con-
ference on Credit, Housing, and the Consequences for New England 11 
(May 30, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.bos.frb.org/news/ 
speeches/rosengren/2008/053008.htm). 
41 Dina ElBoghdady, HUD Chief Calls Aid on Mortgages a Failure, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 17, 2008, at A1. HUD modified the program in November 2008 
by increasing the maximum loan amount to 96.5% of the appraised value 
for some loans, but the changes did not make the program effective. See 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., Bush Administration 
Announces Flexibility for “Hope for Homeowners” Program (Nov. 19, 
2008), available at http://archives.hud.gov/news/2008/pr08-178.cfm; Les 
Christie, HOPE Prevents 1 Foreclosure, CNNMONEY (Mar. 25, 2008, 
12:25 PM),  http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/real_estate/new_hope_plan/ 
(reporting that the program had since its inception helped prevent only one 
foreclosure). 
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In September 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson 
proposed the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 
which was included in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(EESA) that was signed into law in October of that year.42 In 
implementing EESA, however, the Bush Administration declined to 
use TARP funds to provide direct assistance to homeowners at risk 
of foreclosure.43 In January 2009, the incoming Obama admini-
stration obtained Congressional approval to access the second half of 
the $700 billion in TARP funds.44 The incoming director of the 
National Economic Council wrote to Congress that the new 
administration would use $50 to $100 billion of the funds for 
foreclosure mitigation.45 The letter also suggested that the new 
administration would seek to change bankruptcy laws to permit 
cramdowns of primary residence loans.46 
In February 2009, the Obama Administration announced its 
much-anticipated plan to reduce foreclosures, the Making Home 
Affordable (MHA) program.47 In addition to pledging more capital to 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), MHA included two primary programs.48 One 
                                                            
42 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 
101-36, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767-800 (2008).  
43 See id. § 110 (directing federal agencies to “implement a plan that seeks 
to maximize assistance for homeowners . . . to minimize foreclosures.”); 
Mark Mooney, Bush to Ask for TARP; Obama to ‘Rebrand’ It, ABCNEWS. 
COM (Jan. 12, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Economy/story?id= 
6626721&page=1 (explaining Congress’ disapproval over how little of the 
TARP funds had been spent on helping homeowners). 
44 Id. 
45 Letter from Lawrence Summers, Dir.-Designate, Nat’l Econ. Council, to 
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, John Boehner, 
U.S. Representative, Harry Reid, U.S. Senator & Mitch McConnell, U.S. 
Senator (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/ 
letter_from_lawrence_h._summers_to_congressional_leaders/. 
46 Id. 
47 Obama Administration to Expand Housing Plan, MSNBC.COM (May 14, 
2009, 11:30 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30744879/ns/business-
real_estate/t/obama-administration-expand-housing-plan/; see generally 
MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://www.making-homes-affordable.com/ 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2011). 
48 Making Home Affordable Program Guidelines, MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE, http://www.making-homes-affordable.com/Guidelines/ 
making-home-affordable-guidelines.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter Making Home Affordable].   
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program, the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), allowed 
for the refinancing of existing GSE loans up to 125% of the current 
value of the home.49 The second and more ambitious component of 
MHA, the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), called 
on lenders to reduce mortgage payments to thirty-one percent of 
borrower income, after which the federal government would pay fifty 
percent of the cost of reducing them to thirty-eight percent of 
income.50 The plan provided some compensation to servicers and 
annual incentives to borrowers who remained current.51 HAMP also 
implemented a procedure for evaluating borrower claims for loan 
modifications and for implementing the modification process.52 
HAMP was complemented by the near simultaneous 
introduction of HR 1106, which, among other things, resurrected the 
bankruptcy modification proposal contained in the earlier proposal 
by Senator Durbin.53 The Senate, however, rejected the cramdown 
provision.54 The final bill, the Helping Families Save Their Homes 
Act (HFSTHA),55 did include a requirement that, for most mort-
gages, lenders provide tenants of foreclosed properties with 90-day 
notice prior to eviction.56 This was an important provision, not only 
due to its intended protection for tenants, but also because it 
represented the first time that federal law intervened directly in the 
foreclosure process. While some states have adopted their own tenant 
notification laws, HFSTHA set a new floor for tenant protection in 
the event of foreclosures and may have reduced the level of state 
activity in this area. 
Without the stick of bankruptcy modification, HAMP relied 
chiefly on modest carrots in the form of small incentive payments to 
                                                            
49 HARP—Home Affordable Refinancing Program, MAKING HOME 
AFFORDABLE, http://www.making-homes-affordable.com/harp-program.htm 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2011). 
50 Making Home Affordable, supra note 48. 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. § 103 
(2009). 
54 The amendment was proposed on April 30, 2009, but failed to achieve the 
required 60 votes in the affirmative and was later withdrawn from the 
Senate. Senate Vote # 174, GOVTRACK.US (Apr. 30, 2009, 2:47 PM), http:// 
www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2009-174. 
55 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 
123 Stat. 1632 (2009). 
56 Id. § 702(a)(1). 
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servicers and borrowers. The Administration hoped that HAMP 
would result in more than three million permanent mortgage 
modifications.57 Although it was a more substantive and ambitious 
effort than the industry-led Hope Now alliance, HAMP was slow to 
generate any results: as of October 2010 HAMP had produced almost 
1.4 million initial modifications, but fewer than 500 thousand of 
these had moved past the trial period and become permanent.58 
Moreover, by late 2010, even the pace of temporary modifications 
began to slow.59 
Unfortunately, HAMP was not well suited to deal with delin-
quencies and foreclosures driven by growing unemployment and 
borrowers whose homes were worth less than their outstanding 
mortgage. Without realigning loan balances with property values, 
borrowers with severe negative equity60 had limited motivation to 
maintain ownership of their houses, especially if it meant defaulting 
on other debts or placing severe strains on household finances. At the 
same time, without the threat of bankruptcy modification, servicers 
and investors had limited incentive to make sustainable loan 
modifications in numbers large enough to affect foreclosure volumes. 
Another TARP-funded program was the Housing Finance 
Agency Innovation Fund for the Hardest Hit Housing Markets (or the 
“Hardest Hit Fund”):  
 
In February of 2010, the ObamaAdministration 
announced that $1.5 billion from Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) funds would be made 
available to five states hit hard by the foreclosure 
crisis. These funds were aimed at promoting 
“innovative measures” to help families directly 
                                                            
57 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE 
PROGRAM: SERVICER PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH OCTOBER  
2010 7 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Oct%202010%20MHA%20 
Public%20Final.pdf (explaining that forty-one percent to fifty-five percent 
of  the program’s goal of three to four million modification offers had been 
met). 
58 Id. at 2. 
59 Although ninety-four thousand HAMP trials were started in January 
2010, only 29,764 were started in December 2010. Id. at 2. 
60 “Negative equity” refers to the situation in which the total amount of 
indebtedness secured by all mortgages on a parcel of property exceeds the 
fair market value of the property. 
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affected by the foreclosure crisis. The five states, 
which include Arizona, California, Florida, Michi-
gan and Nevada, were those experiencing house 
price declines of more than twenty percent from their 
peak values. . . . The funding would flow through 
state housing finance agencies (HFAs), which have a 
great deal of experience with designing and imple-
menting mortgage revenue bond and homeownership 
financing programs. . . . In late March 2010, the 
Administration announced a second round of the 
Hardest Hit Fund (HHF) involving $600 million in 
additional funding to five more states . . . .61 
 
The five states covered by the second round—North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island and South Carolina—were states 
with areas of dense unemployment.62 A third round of HHF funding, 
which was awarded to states with high unemployment rates, pro-
vided $2 billion to seventeen states and the District of Columbia, 
including nine of the ten states in rounds one and two.63 The third 
round of HHF funding was designated specifically for programs to 
help unemployed homeowners make their mortgage payments over a 
specified period.64 Finally, a fourth round of funding provided an 
additional $3.5 billion to states funded in rounds one, two or three.65 
 
B.  State and Local Nonlegislative Action 
 
The most common state and local foreclosure prevention 
efforts include outreach and counseling, financial assistance and 
legal assistance programs, all of which tend to rely heavily on federal 
resources. These efforts are sometimes coordinated or organized via 
statewide or local foreclosure prevention task forces or networks. 
They may also be complemented by community organizations aimed 
                                                            
61 Dan Immergluck, State Foreclosure Mitigation Strategies: A Comparison 
of Round 1 and 2 Hardest Hit Fund Plans in States With Nonjudicial Fore-
closure Processes 1 (Oct. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter 
State Foreclosure Mitigation Strategies], available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695217. 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id.  
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at holding lenders more accountable so that they can increase 
responsiveness to borrowers’ needs and help borrowers progress 
through loss mitigation and loan modification programs. 
 
1. Outreach and Counseling 
 
Housing counselors help assess the financial hardship of 
borrowers, determine the options available to them, advocate for 
borrowers, and serve as a liaison between borrowers and lenders. 
Federal legislation was created in 2007 to fund a national network of 
counselors through the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling 
(NFMC) program, which is administered by NeighborWorks 
America.66 Some states and cities have supplemented this funding 
through their own initiatives, and nonprofit organizations have 
responded by augmenting their staff and programs to attempt to meet 
a much higher demand for services. 
Foreclosure prevention counseling appears to make a 
significant difference in reducing foreclosures. The Urban Institute’s 
recent evaluation of the NFMC program found that in the first two 
years of the program, the odds of counseled borrowers curing their 
loan defaults and avoiding foreclosure were seventy percent higher 
than if they had not received counseling.67 According to the 
evaluation, thirty-two thousand homeowners avoided foreclosure as a 
direct result of NFMC counseling between 2008 and 2009.68 
One of the key challenges for foreclosure prevention coun-
seling programs is to reach out effectively to at-risk homeowners. 
Counselors and foreclosure prevention task forces have employed 
innovative approaches to reach these borrowers. In Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, local residents and organizations created Foreclosure 
Response, a comprehensive clearinghouse made up of a diverse 
group of stakeholders to disseminate information and coordinate 
                                                            
66 National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program, NEIGHBORWORKS 
AMERICA, http://www.nw.org/network/foreclosure/nfmcp/ (last visited Oct. 
21, 2011). 
67 NEIL MAYER ET AL., NATIONAL FORECLOSURE MITIGATION COUNSELING 
PROGRAM EVALUATION: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM EFFECTS, 
SEPTEMBER 2010 UPDATE, URBAN INSTITUTE 34 (2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412276-prelim-analysis-program-
effects-Sep-2010.pdf.  
68 Id. at 35. 
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interventions.69 Its Eyes Wide Open Program enlists the help of 
neighborhood residents as “volunteer monitors” to spread the word 
about counseling to neighbors having trouble making payments and 
to report neglected vacant homes.70 Foreclosure Response has also 
implemented place-based targeted marketing, outreach, and 
education efforts.71 
The Michigan AmeriCorps Foreclosure Corps program was 
created by the Michigan Coalition Against Homelessness, the Michi-
gan Foreclosure Task Force, and the Community Economic Develop-
ment Association of Michigan.72 It employs AmeriCorps members to 
conduct volunteer training, community outreach, client intake, and 
educational workshops.73 
 
2.  Financial Assistance 
 
Some nonjudicial foreclosure states provide direct financial 
assistance to borrowers. Prior to the advent of the Hardest Hit Fund 
program, most state and local efforts to provide direct financial 
assistance involved refinancing borrowers into lower-cost, fixed rate 
loans, or providing emergency loans to borrowers. Generally, the 
scale of these refinancing programs was modest for two reasons. 
First, many borrowers had loans that were simply too large to 
refinance without first receiving a principal reduction from the 
existing lender (i.e., receiving what is known as a “short refinance”). 
Second, as unemployment, rather than high-cost loans, began to 
cause foreclosures the opportunities to resolve problems by simply 
replacing high-cost with low-cost financing declined. 
Some states provide short-term emergency assistance 
programs to cover late payments and other arrearages for borrowers 
who, once these arrearages are resolved, can afford their existing 
                                                            
69 Organizing for Action in Kent County, Michigan, FORECLO- 
SURE-RESPONSE.ORG, http://www.foreclosure-response.org/policy_guide/ 
coordinated_response.html?tierid=315 (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
70 You Can Help Protect Your Neighborhood and Property Values, 
FORECLOSURERESPONSE.ORG, http://www.foreclosureresponse.org/?page_ 
id=166 (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
71  Organizing for Action in Kent County, Michigan, supra note 69.  
72 Michigan AmeriCorps Foreclosure Prevention Corps, COMMUNITY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION OF MICHIGAN, http://cedam.info/ 
resources/mftf/mafc.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
73 Id. 
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loan or can qualify for a loan modification. For example, North 
Carolina established its Homeowner Protection Program to provide 
loans to homeowners who had lost their jobs.74 
 
3. Legal Assistance 
 
Borrowers in most nonjudicial states are often faced with 
rapid foreclosure processes, and already financially strapped 
homeowners must take affirmative legal action against their lenders 
to prevent or delay the foreclosure process. These homeowners are 
often unable to afford legal counsel or navigate the legal system on 
their own. Additionally, the availability of legal assistance lawyers 
who are adequately trained in foreclosure law is uneven in some 
areas.75 Some states and localities have responded by partnering with 
bar associations to provide pro bono assistance to homeowners at 
risk of foreclosure. For example, Arizona’s Lawyers Helping 
Homeowners (LHH), a program that assigns pro bono attorneys to 
income-eligible homeowners facing foreclosure, is coordinated by 
the State Bar of Arizona, Arizona Foundation for Legal Services and 
Education and the Arizona Supreme Court.76 
Unfortunately, building a strong program of pro bono legal 
assistance for homeowners is difficult. Such programs would require 
significant additional funding to provide direct legal assistance to the 
large volume of homeowners facing foreclosure. While federal 
funding for housing counseling has increased significantly since the 
advent of the foreclosure crisis, efforts to increase funding for legal-
assistance-based foreclosure prevention have not received as much 
support. In awarding more than $7 billion to states through the 
Hardest Hit Fund, the Treasury Department allocated some funding 
to counseling but prohibited states from devoting the funding to legal 
assistance for borrowers.77 Moreover, as federal, state, and local 
                                                            
74 Summary of N.C. Housing Finance Agency Programs, NORTH CAROLINA 
HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY , http://www.nchfa.com/About/facts.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
75 See PIERCE, supra note 29, at 11-12 (comparing the legal training of 
foreclosure lawyers in multiple states). 
76 Id. at 11. 
77 See State Foreclosure Mitigation Strategies, supra note 61, at 6 n.4; 
Katrina vanden Heuval, Treasury Blocks Legal Aid for Homeowners Facing 
Foreclosure, THE NATION. (Dec. 9, 2010, 10:06 AM), http://www. 
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budget pressures continue, legal aid programs may face even greater 
resource constraints. 
 
4. Community Organizing and Advocacy 
 
The federal government’s heavy reliance on incentives alone 
has hindered its efforts to encourage banks to work with borrowers, 
modify loans, and otherwise mitigate foreclosure problems. One 
approach that some locally based organizations have taken is to 
combine housing counseling with targeted community organizing 
and advocacy, aimed either at changing public policy or at 
persuading lenders and servicers to work more aggressively to reduce 
foreclosures. Around the country, perhaps no other group has been 
viewed as more effective in this area than Empowering and Streng-
thening Ohio’s People (ESOP).78 Formerly called the East Side 
Organizing Project because of its focus on the east side of Cleveland, 
ESOP has a long history of negotiating with banks around local 
lending practices. ESOP developed a strategy called “rank ‘em and 
spank ‘em”.79 Under this approach, ESOP meets with homeowners to 
determine which lenders are most difficult to deal with and then 
campaigns to get the lender to sign a commitment to systematic 
modifications.80 By the fall of 2008, ESOP had arranged twelve 
signed agreements that covered roughly twenty lenders and 
servicers.81 ESOP also participated in counseling, with workout rates 
of more than seventy-five percent.82 
While ESOP operates in Ohio, a judicial foreclosure state, 
there have been significant organizing campaigns to reduce fore-
closures in nonjudicial states. In California, the Contra Costa 
Interfaith Supporting Community Organization (CCISCO) has 
demanded meetings with lenders and servicers.83 CCISCO has also 
                                                            
thenation.com/blog/156973/treasury-blocks-legal-aid-homeowners-facing-
foreclosure. 
78 ESOP, http://www.esop-cleveland.org/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011). 
79 Todd Swanstrom et al., Regional Resilience in the Face of Foreclosures: 
Evidence from Six Metropolitan Areas at 14 (MacArthur Found. Research 
On Building Resilient Regions, Working Paper No. 2009-05), available at 
http://metrostudies.berkeley.edu/pubs/reports/2009-05.pdf. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 CONTRA COSTA INTERFAITH SUPPORTING CMTY. ORG., BANK ACCOUNT-
ABILITY: THE KEY TO KEEPING FAMILIES IN THEIR HOMES 2 (2010) 
362 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 31  
 
tried to slow down the foreclosure process by encouraging counties 
to prohibit sheriffs from delivering foreclosure notices unless the 
servicer has made a good faith effort to modify the loan.84 They also 
engaged in a campaign to persuade the City of Richmond to stop 
doing business with banks with high local loan default rates.85 
In Georgia, the Atlanta Fighting Foreclosures Coalition 
(AFFC) is a group of approximately forty organizations including 
unions, housing groups, civil rights groups and others that advocate 
public policy changes and pressure large servicers to work with 
borrowers through loan modifications. AFFC was successful in 
getting one servicer to halt its foreclosures temporarily and drew the 
national leadership of the AFL-CIO into discussions with another.86 
 
5. The Role of State Leadership 
 
State political leaders have taken a variety of nonlegislative 
steps to reduce foreclosures. Such steps include establishing state-
wide foreclosure prevention task forces and negotiating agreements 
with servicers to improve loan modification and loss mitigation 
efforts. At least twenty-four states—both judicial and nonjudicial—
have organized comprehensive task forces to address the foreclosure 
problem.87 These task forces bring together public and private 
stakeholders to identify priorities and work toward solutions to 
reduce foreclosures and mitigate their impact.88 The Massachusetts 
Division of Banks organized two working groups, one that focused 
on rules and enforcement, while the other focused on consumer 
education and foreclosure assistance.89 In Colorado, a task force 
                                                            
available at http://ccisco.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/Bank-
Accountability-The-Key-to-Keeping-Families-in-Their-Homes.pdf. 
84 Swanstrom et al., supra note 79, at 29. 
85 Id. 
86 Katrina vanden Heuvel, AFL Takes on Foreclosures and Payday Lending, 
THE NATION. (Aug. 19, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.thenation.com/ 
blog/154076/afl-takes-foreclosures-and-payday-lending. 
87 PIERCE, supra note 29, at 49. 
88 See id. at 10 (describing the role of task forces in Arizona and Colorado). 
89 See Mortgage Summit Working Groups Release Report, MASS.GOV (Apr. 
11, 2007), http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/mortgage-summit-working-groups-
release-report.html (“[T]wo Working Groups were formed in December 
2006 and began meeting in January 2007: one looking at rules and enforce-
ment and the second focusing on consumer education and foreclosure 
assistance.”).  
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created a video to help train foreclosure counselors.90 Some of the 
work of these task forces may eventually lead to changes in state 
foreclosure law. 
Several governors of nonjudicial states have established 
agreements with banks that service large numbers of loans in their 
states.91 The specific terms of the agreements include freezing 
adjustable interest rates, streamlining loan modification efforts and 
reporting progress back to state government. Nonjudicial states that 
have implemented these types of agreements include California, 
Michigan, Minnesota and Maryland.92 Maryland’s governor nego-
tiated an agreement with six servicers requiring that they (1) provide 
homeowners a timely answer after submission of loss mitigation 
packages, (2) halt foreclosures while considering the mitigation, 
(3) designate representatives who serve as a point of contact during 
the foreclosure process, and (4) establish staff incentives for loan 
modifications.93 
Michigan’s governor reached an agreement with four major 
servicers who agreed to reach out to at-risk borrowers, streamline 
modifications and offer a five-year interest rate freeze.94 They also 
agreed to report regularly to the Michigan Office of Financial Insur-
ance on their outreach and modification efforts.95 The Minnesota 
Department of Commerce and state servicers and lenders created the 
Minnesota Foreclosure Prevention Compact. The compact involves 
voluntary mediation, prevention workshops, housing counselors, 
streamlined loan modification and progress reports. It also requires 
that lenders submit homeowner contact information to counselors 
when the foreclosure process is initiated.96 
Besides governors, attorneys general in some states—
including some nonjudicial states—have been key leaders in 
                                                            
90 PIERCE, supra note 29, at 10. 
91 See id. (“Beginning in 2007, governors began working directly with loan 
servicers and lenders to create plans for lowering the number of fore-
closures.”). 
92 Id. at 19. 
93 Id. at 20. 
94 Radio Address: Granholm Meets with Mortgage Servicers to Ensure They 
Will Help Avoid Foreclosures, MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/ 
som/0,1607,7-192-50778-183346--,00.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
95 Id. 
96 Press Release, Minn. Dep’t of Commerce, Governor Pawlenty Announces 
Additional Actions To Assist Homeowners Facing Foreclosure (Apr. 14. 
2008) (on file with author). 
364 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 31  
 
addressing the foreclosure crisis. They have investigated mortgage 
lenders and servicers over violations of consumer protection and fair 
lending laws. One of the outcomes they often seek is the establish-
ment of a program to improve and increase loan modifications. In 
October 2010, attorneys general from Arizona, Illinois, Florida, 
Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas and Washington reached a 
settlement with Wells Fargo, which agreed to pay $24 million and 
reduce the amount owed on certain mortgages by about $400 
million.97 The settlement followed an investigation into the 
marketing of risky, payment-option mortgages by Wachovia Corp. 
and Golden West Financial Corp., both of which were acquired by 
Wells Fargo.98 For these loans Wells Fargo agreed to reduce the 
loan’s balance to 150% of the home’s value.99 Wells Fargo also 
agreed to additional steps that could reduce a borrower’s monthly 
payment to no more than thirty-one percent of his or her gross 
monthly income.100 Borrowers who make three years of timely 
payments could qualify for an additional principal reduction.101 
 
III. Key Findings from Recent Studies of State Foreclosure 
Law 
 
Over the last two years, there have been a number of 
analyses of state foreclosure law and efforts to modify such law to 
reduce foreclosure levels. These include reports issued by the 
National Governors’ Association,102 the National Consumer Law 
Center,103 the Center for American Progress,104 and the Pew Center 
                                                            
97 Wells Fargo Mortgage Balances Reduced in 8 States, MYBANKTRACKER. 
COM, http://www.mybanktracker.com/bank-news/2010/ 10/07/wells-fargo-
mortgage-balances-reduced-8-states/ (last visited October 19, 2011). 
98 Ruth Simon, Mortgage Pact Set for Wells, Eight States, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
7, 2010, at C3.  
99 Wells Fargo Mortgage Balances Reduced in 8 States, supra note 97. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 29; LAUREN STEWART, NAT’L GOVERNORS 
ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, 2009 STATE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE LAWS (2010), available at http://www.nga.org/ 
files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1001FORECLOSURELAWS2009.PDF. 
103 FORECLOSING A DREAM, supra note 26. 
104 See, e.g., IT’S TIME WE TALKED, supra note 16; ALON COHEN & 
ANDREW JAKABOVICS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NOW WE’RE TALKING: A 
LOOK AT CURRENT STATE-BASED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 
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on the States.105 Taken as a whole, this recent literature focuses on 
efforts to improve loan modification and loss mitigation efforts, 
especially via interventions such as mandatory or voluntary medi-
ation programs. The studies do not focus on nonjudicial foreclosure 
states, however, and most do not aim to provide a comprehensive 
picture of legislative actions during the foreclosure crisis. 
Many states, including California, Colorado, Michigan and 
Nevada, have temporarily halted the foreclosure process to facilitate 
loan workouts and mediation.106 In the summer of 2009, California 
imposed a ninety-day moratorium on foreclosure proceedings.107 
However, all the major loan servicers were allowed to continue 
unabated because they had comprehensive loan modification 
programs already in place.108 As a result, most foreclosures were 
unaffected, and the law had minimal impact.109 Conversely, Nevada’s 
law provides that the borrower’s election to participate in an optional 
mediation program can halt foreclosure proceedings until the 
mediation is complete, allowing the time necessary to conduct a 
thorough loan evaluation.110 
A number of states have sought to protect distressed 
homeowners from foreclosure rescue scams that prey on their 
confusion and fear. These states have enacted greater restrictions on 
programs that promise to avoid foreclosure but are in fact scams 
designed to exploit distressed homeowners. The laws typically 
require full disclosure of a program’s terms and conditions, a ‘right 
to rescind’ period for homeowners, a limitation on the consulting 
fees that can be charged, and terms that prevent the transfer of 
property to the consultant.111 The legislation often includes penalties 
                                                            
AND HOW TO BRING THEM TO SCALE (2010) [hereinafter NOW WE’RE 
TALKING], available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/ 
pdf/foreclosure_ mediation.pdf.  
105 See, e.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: 
STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2008) [hereinafter 
DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM], http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles 
/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_on_the_dream.
pdf. 
106 STEWART, supra note 102, at 4. 
107 NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 27. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.086(3) (2011). 
111 DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM, supra note 105, at 22. 
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for violating these regulations.112 Maryland was one of the first states 
to pass such a law in 2005,113 and several other states have followed 
suit, including Colorado,114 Massachusetts,115 Minnesota116 and New 
Hampshire.117 Maryland’s emergency legislation prohibits predatory 
behavior from foreclosure consultants118 and allows homeowners to 
collect damages if those provisions are violated.  Colorado’s Fore-
closure Protection Act prohibits up-front fees,119 requires agreements 
to be made in writing,120 and creates a three-day rescission period for 
any contract signed with a foreclosure consultant.121 
Many states have passed mediation program legislation in an 
effort to have servicers and homeowners explore mutually beneficial 
alternatives to foreclosure. The goal of these programs is to avoid 
unnecessary foreclosures by reaching solutions that benefit all 
parties: homeowners remain in their homes, while servicers reduce 
their losses from the foreclosure process. Such settlements occur in 
up to seventy percent of mediation cases.122 In other cases when a 
mortgage is too onerous for a homeowner even after mediation, the 
process can facilitate a quicker resolution by negotiating a ‘graceful 
exit’ for the homeowner which avoids a foreclosure, such as the 
lender agreeing to accept a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure or consenting 
to a short sale to a third party purchaser.123 Twenty-one states—most 
with judicial foreclosure regimes—had implemented foreclosure 
mediation programs by mid-2010 and several more were considering 
similar legislation.124 These states vary in their approach, but all are 
striving to provide workable alternatives to foreclosure. 
                                                            
112  Id. 
113 MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. §§ 7-305 to 309 (2011).  
114 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1104 to 1110 (2011).  
115 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 25.00-03 (2011). 
116 MINN. STAT. § 325N.01-.18 (2011).  
117 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §479-B:1 to :11 (2011).  
118 MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. §§ 7-305 to 309 (2011). 
119 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1107 (2011). 
120 Id. §§ 6-1-1104. 
121 Id. §§ 6-1-1104 to 1110. 
122 ALON COHEN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WALK THE TALK: BEST 
PRACTICES ON THE ROAD TO AUTOMATIC FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2 
(2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/11/ 
pdf/walk_the_talk.pdf. 
123 Id. 
124 GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., Executive Summary of 
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Nevada is the first nonjudicial state to institute a mediation 
program.125 The state legislature passed the bill in May 2009,126 and 
the program began two months later. Under Nevada’s mediation 
program, nonjudicial foreclosures are referred to a court-supervised 
mediation program. It is a voluntary program that the homeowner 
must elect to enter within thirty days of being served with a notice of 
intent to foreclose.127 Both parties, the servicer and the borrower, 
must contribute equally to the mediation fee before the process 
begins.128 The servicer must provide a current appraisal of the 
property and documentation proving its standing as mortgage-holder 
during the mediation process.129 The servicer must be represented by 
someone with the authority to finalize a settlement and must negoti-
ate in good faith.130 Once in the program, the foreclosure proceedings 
are suspended until the mediator certifies either a settlement or that 
the parties acted in good faith but could not reach an agreement.131 
Two features are particular to the Nevada program: the 
documentation requirement and the good faith requirement. 
Producing documentation of loan ownership has proved difficult for 
many servicers and may be contributing to a lower foreclosure rate 
since the program was instituted.132 The good faith requirement 
allows better enforcement of the intent of the program. If the 
mediator determines that the servicer is not negotiating in good faith 
he can recommend the case to the court to impose sanctions 
including the forced acceptance of a settlement determined by the 
                                                            
HOMES?, at v (2009), available at http://www.realestateeconomywatch.com/ 
wp-includes/upload-files/ReportS-Sept09.pdf; NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra 
note 104, at 1. 
125 NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 10; see generally NEV. REV. 
STAT. §§ 107.086(3), 107.086(8) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 1 
(2009). 
126 Assemb. 149, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Nev. 2009). 
127 Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 5 (2011). 
128 Id. R. 16. 
129 Id. R. 8. 
130 Id. R. 5. 
131 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 107.086(3), 107.086(8) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure 
Mediation R. 5, 8, 10, 11, 17 (2011). 
132 GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS: UPDATES AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
3 (2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_ 
mortgage/mediation/report-state-mediation-programs-update.pdf. 
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judge.133 However, there have been some complaints that the 
program’s mediation administrator has impeded enforcement of this 
provision.134 
California has a very different, and arguably less effective, 
approach to loan negotiation than Nevada.135 California requires a 
telephone conference between the parties before foreclosure instead 
of formal face-to-face mediation with a neutral third-party.136The law 
does not require the servicer to include someone with the authority to 
modify the loan on the phone call, thus limiting the extent of changes 
that can be made.137The homeowner has fourteen days from being 
served the notice to call a 1-800 number that will provide a list of 
local housing counselors.138 Contacting the counselor is not required 
by law, however.139Because there is no third-party supervision, the 
servicer only has to certify that it made an attempt to contact the 
homeowner.140All of these factors significantly weaken the efficacy 
of the law. In light of negative feedback from participants and the 
failure of the modification program to reduce the rate of foreclosure, 
some have proposed that the law should be revised to include a third-
party monitor to moderate the discussions. These measures have met 
with resistance in the state legislature due to funding concerns 
                                                            
133 See Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 6 (“A hearing shall be held, to the 
extent that the court deems necessary, for the limited purposes of deter-
mining bad faith, enforcing agreements made between the parties within the 
Program, including temporary modification agreements, and determining 
appropriate sanctions pursuant to NRS Chapter 107 as amended.”). 
134 Some critics of the program have argued that the administrator has 
prevented effective sanctions even though the authorizing statute 
specifically provides for such sanctions. Mortgage Mediation Program, 
Nevada Public Radio (Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://www.knpr.org/ 
son/archive/detail2.cfm?SegmentID=7465&ProgramID=2131. 
135 For further discussion on the California loan modification program, see 
IT’S TIME WE TALKED, supra note 16, at 27 (summarizing California’s 
mandate to use a telephone hotline rather than mediation). 
136 Id. 
137 See id. (“Most importantly, the servicer may (but is not required to) 
involve loss mitigation personnel in the call.”). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(h), (g) (2011). 
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because California’s program, unlike Nevada’s, does not charge any 
fee for the mediation services.141 
A survey of these and other mediation programs identifies 
several important considerations for states moving forward with 
these efforts. Two of the biggest issues regarding the effectiveness of 
mediation are how the mediation program is scheduled and how the 
results of such programs are tracked. Most states utilizing mediation 
have made it voluntary instead of automatically scheduled and have 
suffered from low participation rates as a result.142After ten months 
of implementation, Nevada’s voluntary program only had a twenty-
one percent participation rate.143Thus, experience indicates that 
automatically scheduling mediation is crucial to creating greater 
participation among eligible borrowers. The other significant issue is 
a lack of adequate outcome reporting in many existing programs. 
California, Nevada, and Michigan have no formal reporting require-
ments and other programs tend to collect only broad information that 
does not provide useful detail. This makes it difficult to assess 
programs, recognize trends or problems in a locality, and share best 
practices among states.144 
Another issue is the distinction between negotiation and 
mediation programs. States that utilize negotiation—such as 
California, Michigan, and Oregon—lack a neutral third party to 
monitor the proceedings.145 Mediation is likely to provide greater 
accountability by requiring a neutral third party.146 A fourth issue is 
the timing of mediation within the foreclosure process. It should 
                                                            
141  Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 16 (2011); NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra 
note 104, at 28. 
142 NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 4. 
143 Id. at 10 
144 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 7 (2010), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/atj/effective-mediation-prog-strategies.pdf   (“The way to 
determine whether a mediation program is actually effective is through care-
ful tracking and evaluation of program data. At a minimum, participation 
and settlement rates should be tracked. A more comprehensive approach 
would include tracking not just the occurrence of a settlement, but also the 
substance of the agreement . . . , the time period for achieving resolution 
. . ., and whether homeowners had the  assistance of a counselor or 
attorney. . . .”). 
145 NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 5. 
146 Id. at 5-6.  
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occur as early as possible to maximize its benefits and permit enough 
time to complete the process. 
The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) recommends a 
loan modification strategy called mandatory loss mitigation.147This 
method requires the servicer to conduct an analysis of potential alter-
natives to foreclosure. Loss mitigation is part of some state fore-
closure laws but is often not adequately enforced. CRL recommends 
including a loss mitigation application with any formal pre-fore-
closure communication in order to gather necessary borrower 
information such as income and other debt obligations that help 
determine eligibility.148 
The CRL report also suggests requiring a loss mitigation 
analysis as early in the pre-foreclosure process as possible. The 
standards to conduct such an analysis should build on existing 
regulations such as the federal HAMP requirements or those of 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA, because doing so would 
avoid the need for each state to develop their own standards.149 
Another recommendation is to require an affidavit explaining to the 
homeowner why they did or did not qualify for a loan modification. 
This form would provide accountability for the homeowner to 
confirm that the servicer used the correct inputs and would allow 
judicial intervention if necessary.150The CRL strongly recommends 
including enforcement standards in the loss mitigation process that 
hold servicers responsible to both the borrower and the general 
public while giving states the power to police these efforts.151Finally, 
mediation should be incorporated into the appeals process when a 
homeowner is denied a loan modification.152 
 
  
                                                            
147 See SARA WEED & SONIA GARRISON, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
FORECLOSURE AS A LAST RESORT: STATES CAN STABILIZE THE HOUSING 
MARKET BY PREVENTING UNNECESSARY FORECLOSURES 1 (2010), available 
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/ 
states/20101021-State-Loss-Mit-Brief-Final.pdf (suggesting that states use 
“an existing industry standard, ‘mandatory loss mitigation’”). 
148 Id. at 9. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 10. 
152 Id. 
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IV. An Analysis of Legislative Activity in Nonjudicial States 
 
A. The Scope of Legislative Changes 
 
We now directly examine changes in state laws that affect 
the servicing, default and foreclosure processes of single-family (1-4 
unit) residential mortgages. The intent is to understand the scale, 
scope and nature of the changes that state legislatures adopted as the 
foreclosure crisis developed and spread nationally. After first 
analyzing the numbers and types of adopted laws, as well as their 
relationship to a state’s foreclosure rate, we then identify a set of 
legislatively active states in different parts of the country and 
examine policy changes in these states more closely. This analysis 
focuses on the state legislative provisions that cover practices and 
processes concerning both previously originated mortgages and the 
handling of loans at some stage of delinquency, default or 
foreclosure.153 For contextual purposes, we also analyze the 
frequency of laws affecting the origination of mortgage loans and, in 
particular, provisions to tighten the regulation of high-risk lending or 
to improve consumer protections in the origination process. 
                                                            
153 Not included here are legislative measures aimed at the problems 
associated with vacant, foreclosed homes and the spillover problems they 
impose on neighborhoods. These laws include statutes permitting localities 
to adopt vacant property registration ordinances. Our primary approach was 
to begin by building a data set of all legislation adopted in nonjudicial 
foreclosure states from January 2005 to May 2010. For each of the thirty-
three nonjudicial states and the District of Columbia, we used Westlaw to 
identify potentially relevant changes in law by searching the legislative 
service as well as the bill summaries databases since 2005. Depending upon 
the theory of mortgage law followed in a given jurisdiction, we searched for 
terms such as “deed of trust,” “mortgage,” “security deed” and 
“foreclosure.” We reviewed thousands of enacted bills and code sections 
relating to the foreclosure process, culling the results to include only 
relevant pieces of enacted legislation. Once all enacted legislation was 
identified, each act was coded for the types of provisions that it contained; 
these categories and subcategories are detailed in Figure 2. Then, 
summations were tabulated across various categories of provisions and over 
the five-year period. Because legislative calendars vary across states and 
legislative activity ebbs and flows at different times in the year, this part of 
the study only looks at laws enacted through calendar year 2009 instead of  
looking at the entire timeframe for which we have data (January 2005 
through May 2010). 
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However, the focus is primarily on nearer-term efforts to reduce 
foreclosures among loans that have already been originated. 
The four main categories of legislative provisions154 are 
those concerning: (1) the foreclosure sale/auction process itself, and 
processes and issues immediately following the foreclosure 
sale/auction; (2) the pre-foreclosure sale process,155 such as the 
establishment of mediation programs, notice requirements and 
procedures, rights to cure and reinstate, and direct efforts to slow or 
stop foreclosures such as forbearance programs or moratoria; 
(3) ancillary processes, including data collection and recording 
requirements; and (4) regulation of loan servicers. 
 
 
  
                                                            
154 The term legislative “provisions” is used specifically to mean provisions 
within acts that were deemed to change some aspect of the mortgage 
process or requirements in the state. The number of such provisions is not 
equivalent to the “number of adopted bills” or the “number of acts” because 
one act may include multiple measures affecting different aspects of the 
mortgage or foreclosure process. Each act was coded for whether it had a 
substantive impact on each of the categories and subcategories identified. 
Thus, one act might be coded as falling into several categories. 
155 By “pre-foreclosure sale process,” we mean activities that occur between 
the time a loan becomes delinquent or in default and the time a foreclosure 
sale occurs and the property is auctioned either to a third party or to the 
mortgagee. 
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Figure 2. Breakdown of Adopted Legislative Provisions: January 
2005 to May 2010 
 
 
 
Provisions concerning pre-foreclosure sale processes 
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study period. The next largest category was provisions concerning 
foreclosure sale, post-sale and deficiency issues, which accounted for 
seventeen percent of all provisions. Fifteen percent of provisions 
concerned supportive processes such as data collection and 
recording. Only thirteen provisions (seven percent) concerned 
servicer regulation. 
Of the sixty-one percent of provisions concerning pre-
foreclosure sale processes, a bit more than half concerned pre-
foreclosure sale notice and advertising requirements. The next largest 
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over twenty percent of the pre-foreclosure sale process provisions, 
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somewhat surprisingly, provisions calling specifically for the 
availability of counseling or mediation accounted for only six percent 
of all provisions. This is likely explained by the difficulty of 
requiring mediation or counseling activities within the structure of a 
nonjudicial foreclosure system. Such initiatives have been much 
more common in judicial states.156 
 
B. Changes in Legislative Activity over Time 
 
The largest increase in legislative provisions aimed at the 
foreclosure problem, other than lending and consumer protection 
laws, were those concerning the pre-foreclosure sale process, 
including those encouraging mediation efforts or loan modification, 
those requiring increased or earlier notices to borrowers, those 
changing the foreclosure timeline (typically expanding it), and those 
imposing some sort of a moratorium on foreclosures. These 
provisions remained essentially flat from 2005 to 2007 at seven to 
ten provisions adopted per year, but they increased quite rapidly in 
2008 and 2009 as the national foreclosure crisis peaked. Nonjudicial 
states adopted twenty-five such provisions in 2008 and forty-five in 
2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
156 IT’S TIME WE TALKED, supra note 16, at 7. 
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Figure 3. Number of Legislative Provisions Adopted in 
Nonjudicial States, 2005 – 2009 
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consistent pattern of growth. The annual number of these provisions 
bounced around from three to nine between 2005 and 2009.157 
Nonetheless, the results here suggest that some legislatures gave at 
least modest attention to the loan servicing and foreclosure process 
even before these problems received national attention. 
Among the legislative activities seeking to impact the pre-
foreclosure sale process, legislation regulating the foreclosure notice 
and advertising process grew most between 2007 and 2009. The 
number of provisions in this subcategory increased from three in 
2006 and five in 2007 to sixteen in 2008 and nineteen in 2009. 
Legislative activity also increased noticeably in the area of fore-
closure forbearance, modification and moratoria (from zero to one in 
2005 through 2007 to seven in 2008 and eleven in 2009) and in the 
area of mediation and counseling (from zero in 2005 through 2007 to 
one in 2008 and eight in 2009). Activity affecting the presale rights 
of borrowers and tenants and the availability of nonjudicial 
foreclosure increased less. 
 
C. Provisions That Lengthened or Shortened the 
Pre-foreclosure Sale Process 
 
One problem that distressed borrowers face in many nonjudi-
cial states is a relatively short foreclosure timeline. In general, the 
notice-to-sale period in judicial states tends to be significantly longer 
than in nonjudicial states. In places with brief notice-to-sale periods, 
opportunities for obtaining a loan modification or attaining some 
more favorable alternative to foreclosure (e.g., short sales) are more 
constrained. In fact, cure rates (the rate at which distressed borrowers 
recover from severe delinquency or default before losing their home 
via foreclosure, short-sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure) fall and 
foreclosure completion rates increase when pre-foreclosure sale 
periods are less than four months.158 
During the latter half of the 2000s, several states took steps 
to add notice periods or lengthen existing periods to provide more 
opportunities to avoid foreclosure, and only two states reduced the 
pre-foreclosure sale period. In one of these states, however, the 
                                                            
157 This period predates the attention given to problems of false or fraudu-
lent documentation and improper foreclosure procedures involving many 
major lenders. Widespread awareness of these issues did not occur until the 
fall of 2010, after the focus period of this study. 
158 Cutts & Merrill, supra note 9, at 203. 
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change was not substantial (five days),159 and in the other state it was 
a temporary measure intended for abandoned properties or cases 
where borrowers requested an expedited foreclosure.160 A total of 
twenty acts between 2005 and 2009 increased the notice-to-sale 
period. Moreover, most were enacted in 2008 (six) and 2009 (eight). 
Most of these changes ranged from a few days to thirty days, with a 
couple of exceptions. In California, for example, an act in 2009 
increased the time between a notice of default and a notice of 
foreclosure sale by ninety days for mortgages originated between 
2003 and 2007. Other nonjudicial states that adopted laws that 
increased the pre-foreclosure sale process by more than thirty days 
included Maryland, Massachusetts and Michigan. Some of these acts 
only applied to certain subsets of loans or borrowers, however, such 
as loans originated over a specified period. 
    
                                                            
159 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(4) (West 2011) (providing that the person 
authorized to take a sale may file a notice of sale up to five days before the 
lapse of the three-month notice-to-sale period). 
160 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-903(1)(c) (2011) (providing that an eligible 
debt holder may file a motion for an order for expedited sale if “the property 
has been abandoned or, in the alternative, the grantor of the deed of trust 
requests the order for expedited sale”). 
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Figure 4. Legislative Provisions Addressing Pre-foreclosure Sale 
Process by Subcategory 
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Figure 5. Number of Acts Increasing/Decreasing the Foreclosure 
Notice-to-Sale Period 
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requirements. Servicer regulations, the smallest category of activity, 
were more concentrated. Only six states (Colorado, North Carolina, 
Arizona, Virginia, Hawaii and New Mexico) adopted any provisions 
concerning servicer regulation. 
Colorado enacted the most legislation affecting the pre-
foreclosure sale process, having adopted twelve such provisions.161 
Nevada, Minnesota, Michigan and California adopted between eight 
and eleven provisions in this category, and Washington, Tennessee, 
Oregon, Utah and Arizona adopted six to seven such provisions. 
Another five states adopted four to five provisions, and eleven states 
adopted one to three provisions. Seven states and the District of 
Columbia adopted no provisions in this category. 
 
   
                                                            
161 One possible explanation for Colorado’s high level of activity is the fact 
that the state’s foreclosure problems predated the rise of foreclosures in 
many other states. This is because Colorado’s foreclosures were related 
partly to the weakened state economy following the dot-com bust in the 
early 2000s. Given the nature of state legislative processes and behavior, it 
may well take more than one legislative session to get a proposed measure 
through the legislature. Moreover, there is also a natural lag between the 
timing of a problem and the legislative response. For these reasons, the 2005 
to early 2010 period may coincide more with the peak of Colorado’s 
legislative activities, while in other states high levels of activity did not 
begin until the later part of this period and may be extending well beyond 
the period. This explanation is consistent with the fact that a relatively large 
share of the measures in Colorado was adopted before 2009 as compared to 
other states. 
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Figure 6. Adopted Provisions by State, January 2005 to May 2010 
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Figure 7. Adopted Provisions Concerning Pre-foreclosure Sale 
Processes, January 2005 to May 2010 
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Several states took steps to lengthen or shorten the notice-to-
sale period.162 The vast majority of these provisions were aimed at 
lengthening the presale process. There were only two exceptions. 
California adopted a provision that effectively shortened the 
prescribed notice-to-sale period by five days, although the state 
adopted other measures that effectively lengthened the foreclosure 
process.163 Colorado adopted a law that, until 2013, provides for an 
expedited foreclosure process for abandoned properties or in cases 
where the borrower requests such a process.164 Most of the process-
lengthening provisions made relatively modest changes (thirty days 
or less) to the notice-to-sale period, although in some states with very 
quick foreclosure processes, even fifteen to thirty days can be a 
substantial increase. Many of the states that effectively increased the 
notice-to-sale period did so in conjunction with efforts to provide 
increased notice or opportunities for loan modifications and 
mediation. 
                                                            
162 A number of states took measures to shorten post-sale redemption 
periods. These are not covered in this analysis of pre-foreclosure notice-to-
sale periods. 
163 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(4) (West  2011). 
164 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-903(1)(c) (2011). 
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would not expect to see similar responses in Montana and Nevada, 
for example.165 
Indeed, states with very high foreclosure rates tended to have 
higher levels of legislative activity. However, there is a substantial 
amount of variance in legislative activity that is not explained by 
foreclosure rate.166 For example, California had higher levels of 
legislative activity than Arizona despite similarly high foreclosure 
rates. Some states with more moderate foreclosure rates, such as 
Oregon and Colorado, had significantly higher amounts of legislative 
activity than states with somewhat higher foreclosure rates such as 
Georgia, Mississippi and Rhode Island. As might be expected, states 
with very low foreclosure rates (e.g., North Dakota, Wyoming, 
Montana, South Dakota and Alaska) saw very little legislative 
activity. 
Most of the legislative activity between January 2009 and 
May 2010 focused on outstanding loans and not on regulating new 
originations because legislative activity in the two areas is positively 
correlated. States that were active in one area tended to be active in 
the other as well. 
                                                            
165 A more sophisticated goal would be to model legislative activity over 
time and across states, controlling for multiple factors that might affect such 
activity. The effort here is much less ambitious; there is no attempt to 
identify or control for all of the various causes of such activity or to predict 
legislative activity. 
166 The straight line in each figure is a linear bivariate regression line. The 
R-square, which gives the proportion of the variance in legislative activity 
that is explained by the foreclosure rate, is approximately 0.40 for both 
plots. 
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Figure 9. Adopted Provisions Concerning Outstanding Loans 
versus Foreclosure Starts 
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Figure 10. Adopted Provisions Concerning All Loans versus 
Foreclosure Starts 
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county recorder.167 Within ten days of the recordation, the lender 
mailed a notice of the recording date to each borrower and to each 
person who had requested such notice. 168 After filing the notice of 
default, the lender had to wait three months before giving notice of 
the sale.169 A written notice of the time and place of the pending 
foreclosure sale had to be posted on the property, posted in the city or 
judicial district where the property was to be sold, and recorded with 
the county recorder at least fourteen days before the foreclosure 
sale.170 
From January 2005 to May 2010, California adopted ten 
foreclosure-related provisions, eight of which addressed the pre-
foreclosure process. The most significant change to existing 
mortgage law was contained in Assembly Bill 7, the Foreclosure 
Prevention Act of 2009. 171 Between May 21, 2009, and January 1, 
2011, a lender had to wait an additional ninety days after the three-
month statutory period expired before providing notice if the 
mortgage was a first mortgage on an owner-occupied home and was 
recorded between January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2008. 172 This 
additional delay was intended to allow the parties to pursue a loan 
modification.173 The lender could avoid this additional ninety-day 
delay if the lender had obtained an order of exemption by 
implementing a comprehensive loan modification program.174 Such a 
program was intended to keep borrowers in their principal residence 
when the expected recovery from modification was greater than the 
expected recovery from foreclosure.175 The servicer must have 
sought to achieve long-term sustainability for a borrower pursuing 
modification by limiting the ratio of their housing-related debt to 
their gross income to thirty-eight percent or less.176 Finally, the 
                                                            
167 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(a)(1) (West 2011). 
168 Id. § 2924b(b)(1). 
169 Id. §§ 2924(a)(2)-(3). 
170 Id. § 2924f(b)(1). 
171 The California Foreclosure Prevention Act added sections 2923.52 and 
2923.53, the effects of which are discussed in this paragraph. These sections 
were subject to sunset provisions, however, and expired on January 1, 2011. 
California Foreclosure Prevention Act, Assemb. 7, 2009-2010 Leg., 2nd 
Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
172 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.52(a) (West 2009) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. § 2923.53(a) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011). 
175 Id. § 2923.53(a)(1) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011). 
176 Id. §§ 2923.53(a)(2) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011). 
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program had to include some combination of an interest rate reduc-
tion, term extension, deferral of some portion of the principal 
amount, reduction of principal, or compliance with a federally 
mandated modification program such as HAMP.177 
Another law adopted the year before the Foreclosure 
Prevention Act extended the pre-foreclosure timeline.178 Senate Bill 
1137 states that prior to filing a notice of default for a mortgage 
executed or recorded between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 
2007, the lender must first contact the borrower in person or by 
telephone to assess their financial situation and explore options to 
avoid foreclosure.179 During this required contact, the borrower must 
be advised of her right to request a subsequent meeting, which must 
occur within fourteen days.180 The lender must provide a toll-free 
telephone number to a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.181 
The lender is able to meet this contact requirement despite failing to 
contact the borrower if contact was attempted with due diligence, a 
statutorily defined standard involving a series of mailing and 
telephone attempts.182 The lender cannot file the notice of default 
until thirty days after either the initial contact or the satisfaction of 
the due diligence requirement.183 
Senate Bill 1137 also extended an advanced notice of sale to 
renters of a foreclosed property.184 Until January 1, 2013, notice of a 
pending foreclosure sale must also be provided to the residents of the 
foreclosed property if the billing address on the mortgage does not 
match the property address.185 The notice must inform the residents 
that the property will be sold no less than twenty days from receipt of 
the notice and inform the residents that if they are renters, they are 
entitled to sixty days notice of eviction or a new lease agreement 
with the new property owner.186 This is an extension from the 
previous fourteen-day notice of sale and thirty-day notice of eviction. 
                                                            
177 Id. § 2923.52(a)(3) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011). 
178 Id. § 2923.5(a)(2). 
179 S. 1137, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2008). 
180 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5(h) (West 2011). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. § 2923.5(g). 
183 See id. § 2923.5(a)(1) (outlining when a trustee, mortgagee, or other 
authorized agent may file a notice of default). 
184 S. 1137, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Cal. 2008). 
185 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.8(a) (West 2011). 
186 Id. § 2924.8(a). 
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Since this law was passed, however, HFSTHA was passed. HFSTHA 
includes a requirement that, for most mortgages, lenders are now 
required to provide tenants of foreclosed properties with a ninety-day 
notice prior to eviction.187 
Senate Bill 306, passed in late 2009, also extended the notice 
of sale requirements from fourteen days to twenty days.188 More 
significantly, it clarified the intent of pooling and servicing agree-
ments (PSAs) regarding the responsibilities of the servicer to the 
investors of mortgage-backed securities.189 This was intended to 
promote beneficial loan modifications and address concerns that 
some PSAs might impede loan modifications.190 The statute states 
that any duty a servicer has to maximize net present value (NPV) for 
investors should be interpreted as requiring maximization of NPV for 
all investors as a group and not any one particular investor.191 Thus, 
if the expected recovery from a loan modification exceeds the 
expected recovery from a foreclosure on a net present value basis 
then the servicer can implement the modification in the best interests 
of all the investors.192 
Several other laws adopted during this period altered the 
foreclosure process. Assembly Bill 2678 prevents a notice of sale 
from being posted while the servicer is in negotiations with the 
borrower to modify a loan.193 Senate Bill 1221 reduces the period for 
a notice of sale by no more than five days before the end of the 
statutory three-month waiting period.194 
Overall, most of the provisions passed by California between 
January 2005 and May 2010 were intended to favor the borrower. 
However, the effectiveness of some of these provisions has been 
called into question.195 The Foreclosure Prevention Act is notable in 
this regard: it allowed all of the major servicers to gain an exemption 
                                                            
187 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 
702(a), 123 Stat. 1632, 1660-61 (2009). 
188 S. 306, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
189 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.6(a) (2011). 
190 Id. § 2923.6(b). 
191 Id. § 2923.6(a).  
192 Id. § 2923.6(a)(2). 
193 Assemb. 2678, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
194 S. 1221, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
195  For example, the effectiveness of California’s loan modification program 
has been undermined by that state’s failure to involve a neutral third-party 
mediator in the modification process.  NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 
104, at 27-28.  
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from the ninety-day waiting period because they already had 
comprehensive loan modification programs that complied with 
HAMP guidelines.196 
 
B.  Colorado 
 
Colorado’s foreclosure process is essentially a hybrid of 
judicial and nonjudicial processes because the lender must obtain an 
initial court order authorizing the foreclosure.197 Before 2005, 
Colorado’s foreclosure procedure provided that at least thirty days 
after default on a deed of trust, the debt holder could file a notice of 
election of remedies with the public trustee of the county where the 
property was located.198 The combined notice, which included the 
notice of sale, the right to cure, and the right to redeem, had to be 
mailed no more than twenty days after the recording of this notice.199 
The combined notice also had to be published once per week for five 
consecutive weeks prior to the sale.200 
Currently, the lender’s initial motion to foreclose has to be 
accompanied by a copy of the instrument containing the power of 
sale, a description of the property, and an explanation of the default 
justifying the foreclosure.201 The clerk sets a time between twenty 
and thirty days after the filing of the motion for a hearing.202 Notice 
of this hearing has to be posted in a conspicuous place on the 
property and has to be served on each person named in the motion at 
least fifteen days before the date set for the hearing.203 If the court 
                                                            
196 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924-2924b (2011); HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICA-
TION PROGRAM, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: HANDBOOK FOR 
SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES §§ 1.1-1.2 (Jun. 1, 2011), available 
at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mha 
handbook_32.pdf. 
197 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-105(2)(a) (2011). 
198 See id. § 38-38-101(a)-(h) (stipulating that, “[w]henever a holder of an 
evidence of debt declares a violation of a covenant of deed of trust and 
elects to publish all or a portion of the property therein described for sale, 
the holder or the attorney for the holder shall file . . . with the public trustee 
of the county where the property is located”). 
199 Id. § 38-38-103(1)(a). 
200 Id. § 38-38-103(5)(a). 
201 COLO. R. CIV. P. 120(a) (2011). 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 120(a)-(b); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-105(3) (“Not less than 
fifteen days before the date set for the hearing . . . the holder or the attorney 
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grants the lender’s motion based on its findings, the lender must 
submit a bid to the officer no later than the second business day 
before the foreclosure sale.204 Prior to the changes discussed here, the 
sale had to occur between forty-five and sixty days after the 
recording of the notice of election and demand.  
In the period between January 2005 and May 2010, Colorado 
was the most active state in adopting provisions to change the 
foreclosure process and timeline. The Colorado legislature enacted 
many measures early in this period. In total, Colorado enacted 
nineteen such provisions, twelve of which directly affected the pre-
foreclosure process. The first significant change came in 2006, when 
Colorado passed House Bill 1387.205 This law increased the amount 
of time required between the filing of the notice of election and 
demand and the date of the foreclosure sale by sixty-five days.206 The 
new law requires that the sale take place between 110 and 125 days 
after the notice, instead of just forty-five to sixty days after the 
notice.207 The contents of the notice were also expanded.208 Under 
House Bill 1387, a notice of election must contain specific 
information, including the names of the original parties to the deed of 
trust, the name of the holder of the note, the remaining outstanding 
balance on the loan, a legal description of the property and a 
statement of the default that justifies the foreclosure.209 
In 2008, another important piece of legislation was passed. 
House Bill 1402 extended the pre-foreclosure timeline by thirty days 
and required the lender to notify the borrower of certain foreclosure 
counseling programs.210 The law requires that the lender or servicer 
                                                            
for the holder seeking an order authorizing sale under this section for a 
residential property shall cause a notice of hearing . . . to be posted in a 
conspicuous place on the property that is the subject of the sale.”). 
204 Id. § 38-38-106(1). 
205 See H.R. 1387, 65th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (adding 
definitions to the foreclosure chapter and repealing and re-enacting fore-
closure procedure statutes). 
206 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-108(1)(a) (2011). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. § 38-38-101(4)(a)-(j).  
209 Id. 
210 See H.R. 1402, 66th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2008) 
(requiring mortgagee to provide mortgagor with a notice containing the 
phone number of the Colorado foreclosure hotline and “the direct telephone 
number of the holder’s loss mitigation representative or department” at least 
thirty days before filing notice of demand and election). 
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mail a notice of intent to foreclose to the borrower at least thirty days 
prior to filing the formal notice of election and demand, thus 
increasing the foreclosure timeline.211 The notice of intent to 
foreclose must also contain the telephone number of the Colorado 
foreclosure hotline and the direct telephone number of the holder’s 
loss mitigation department. 212 
In 2009, the state legislature passed House Bill 1276, which 
created additional requirements to notify the borrower of 
opportunities for foreclosure deferment.213 The law states that within 
fifteen days of filing the notice of election and demand, the holder 
must post a notice of the opportunity for foreclosure deferment in a 
conspicuous place on the property or personally serve the borrower 
with such notice.214 Within twenty days of the posting, the borrower 
must contact a foreclosure counselor, who must inform them of the 
federal HAMP program.215 The counselor then has thirty days to 
determine whether the borrower is eligible for a foreclosure 
deferment.216 This determination includes an assessment of the 
borrower’s ability to pay and the probability of reaching a mutually 
beneficial loan modification.217 
If the borrower is eligible for deferment, she must make 
payments to the lender equal to at least two-thirds of the monthly 
payment that was due prior to the delinquency throughout the term of 
the deferment, which is initially ninety days.218 If the borrower 
qualifies for a foreclosure deferment, all remaining published and 
mailed notifications of the foreclosure sale must be cancelled.219 The 
deferment can be terminated early under a number of circumstances, 
including if the borrower abandons the property or fails to comply 
with the conditions of deferment.220 
In 2010, the Colorado legislature passed House Bill 1249, 
creating a temporary procedure to shorten the foreclosure process for 
                                                            
211 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-102.5(2) (2011).  
212 Id. 
213 H.R. 1276, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st  Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009). 
214 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-802(1) (2011). 
215 Id. § 38-38-803(2)-(3).  
216 Id. § 38-38-803(5)(a).   
217 Id. § 38-38-804(1)(a)-(b).   
218 Id. § 38-38-803(6); id. § 38-38-805(2)(a). 
219 Id. § 38-38-803(6). 
220 Id. § 38-38-805(4)(a)-(e). 
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certain properties.221 Beginning on August 1, 2010, and continuing 
until August 1, 2013, a lender filing a foreclosure may request an 
expedited sale at the same time.222 The lender must file a motion with 
the court stating that the lender is eligible, that the deed of trust 
secures an eligible debt, and that the property has been abandoned or 
that the borrower requests the order for an expedited foreclosure.223 
A notice of the hearing must be posted on the property or personally 
served on the borrower at least fifteen days prior to its occurrence.224 
If the court finds the evidence clear and compelling and no one 
objects,225 the lender must then set a date of sale between forty-five 
and sixty-five days after the recording of the notice of election and 
demand.226 
Colorado also passed several provisions between January 
2005 and May 2010 that did not affect the foreclosure timeline. For 
example, House Bill 1197 created an official county-level fore-
closure database that would report notices of election and demand, 
properties sold at auction and instances of curing.227 The bill was 
intended to provide the general public and policy makers with 
accurate information, help facilitate trend forecasts and make it easy 
to analyze regional differences.228 In addition, House Bill 1207 made 
several minor changes to the cure and redemption procedures and 
added certain parties to the list of those required to receive 
notifications of the foreclosure.229 
Overall, the provisions adopted in Colorado favored the 
borrower by extending the notice-to-sale period by almost three 
months and mandating notification of foreclosure hotlines and 
deferment options. House Bill 1387 (2006), House Bill 1402 (2008) 
and House Bill 1276 (2009) were the key pieces of legislation in this 
shift toward a more borrower-friendly foreclosure process. As 
explained above, one important aspect of the deferment process 
created by House Bill 1276 is the requirement that borrowers pay 
66.66% of the required monthly mortgage payments while in 
                                                            
221 H.R. 1249, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2nd  Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010). 
222 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-902(1)(a) (2011). 
223 Id. § 38-38-903(1)(a)-(c). 
224 Id. § 38-38-903(2). 
225 Id. § 38-38-903(3). 
226 Id. § 38-38-902(2). 
227 H.R. 1197, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st  Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009).  
228 Id. 
229 H.R. 1207, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st  Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009).  
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deferment.230 Supporters suggest that this requirement focuses efforts 
on those most likely to succeed with a loan modification,231 but it 
may also unnecessarily exclude other candidates, thus limiting the 
number of people who benefit from the program.  
 
C. Michigan 
 
The adopted provisions in Michigan favored the interests of 
the borrower by requiring notice of various foreclosure mediation 
opportunities. In Michigan, notice of a pending nonjudicial fore-
closure sale must be published in a local newspaper at least once a 
week for four consecutive weeks.232 The notice must state (1) the 
names of the borrower, the originating lender and the current lender 
or mortgagee; (2) the date of the mortgage and of its recordation; 
(3) the amount due; (4) a description of the house; and (5) the length 
of the post-sale redemption period.233 Fifteen days after notice is first 
published, a copy of that notice must be posted in a conspicuous 
place on any part of the home.234 Within twenty days of sale, the 
purchaser must record the foreclosure deed.235 The post-sale redemp-
tion period ranges from one month for residential mortgages on 
abandoned property with greater than two-thirds of the original 
indebtedness outstanding,236 to one year for occupied residential 
properties with less than two-thirds of the original indebtedness 
outstanding.237 
Between January 2005 and May 2010, Michigan adopted 
eight foreclosure-related provisions, all of which affected the pre-
foreclosure process. Six of these provisions were contained in three 
statutes enacted in mid-2009: House Bills 4453, 4454 and 4455.238 
These bills comprised a package of legislation requiring foreclosing 
lenders to offer modification negotiations to borrowers. The key 
                                                            
230 H.R. 1276, 67th Gen. Assemb., 1st  Reg. Sess. § 5 (Colo. 2009). 
231  PIERCE, supra note 29, at 24. 
232 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3208 (2011). 
233 Id. § 600.3212. 
234 Id. § 600.3208. 
235 Id. § 600.3232. 
236 Id. § 600.3240(7)-(12). 
237 Id. § 600.3240(12); see also id. § 600.3241a (providing that abandon-
ment is determined by a statutory procedure and scheme of presumptions).  
238 H.R. 4453, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009); H.R. 4454, 95th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009); H.R. 4455, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2009). 
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provisions of the legislation require that the lender provide written 
notice to the borrower containing an explanation of the default and 
the amount outstanding on the mortgage, the lender or servicer’s 
contact information and a designated party for modification 
discussions.239 The notice must also provide a list of approved 
housing counselors and inform the borrower that she may request a 
meeting with the lender’s designee within fourteen days of the notice 
to attempt to work out a modification.240 The notice must inform the 
borrower that if she pursues modification discussions, foreclosure 
proceedings will be deferred for ninety days after the notice was 
mailed.241 The notification must also indicate that the lender must 
proceed via a judicial foreclosure if the borrower meets statutory 
modification criteria but the parties cannot reach a modification 
agreement.242 
Within seven days of mailing this notice to the borrower, the 
lender or servicer must also publish a notice informing the borrower 
of her rights as described above.243 If the lender fails to comply with 
the pre-foreclosure notice requirements—including notice of the 
right to mediation—before commencing the foreclosure process, the 
borrower may bring an action to enjoin the foreclosure.244 A 
borrower who wishes to work out a modification of a mortgage loan 
must elect to engage in modification discussions by contacting a 
housing counselor within fourteen days of the lender mailing the 
notice of default.245 Furthermore, the housing counselor must notify 
the lender of the borrower’s request within ten days of being 
contacted by the borrower.246 The counselor must then schedule a 
meeting for modification discussions and attend the meeting if the 
borrower so requests.247 
If no loan modification results from the discussions, the 
housing counselor must work with the borrower to determine 
whether she qualifies for a modification based on criteria similar to 
                                                            
239 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.3205a(1)(a)-(c) (2011). 
240 Id. § 600.3205a(1)(d). 
241 Id. § 600.3205a(1)(e). 
242 Id. § 600.3205a(1)(g). 
243 Id. § 600.3205a(4). 
244 Id. § 600.3205a(5). 
245 Id. § 600.3205b(1). 
246 Id.  
247 Id. § 600.3205b(3). 
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federal HAMP requirements.248 If the borrower is eligible, the lender 
may not proceed with nonjudicial foreclosure but can pursue judicial 
foreclosure.249 The borrower has fourteen days from notification of 
any proposed modification to accept it.250 If the lender attempts to 
proceed with the nonjudicial foreclosure process in violation of this 
procedure, the borrower may file suit to convert the proceeding to a 
judicial foreclosure.251 One important aspect is that the calculations 
made to determine the borrower’s eligibility must be made available 
to the borrower, a requirement not present in some other states.252 
In addition to these changes, Michigan adopted Senate Bill 
749, which disallowed nonjudicial foreclosure against service 
members during active duty or six months thereafter.253 This was one 
of the very few changes in state laws during this period that added 
restrictions on the use of nonjudicial foreclosure. 
 
D. Minnesota 
 
In Minnesota, the lender must give six weeks’ published 
notice of the pending foreclosure sale and must serve the homeowner 
with a copy of the notice at least four weeks before the sale.254 Along 
with the notice of foreclosure sale, and with every subsequent written 
communication regarding the foreclosure mailed to the borrower, the 
lender must also include a foreclosure advice notice.255 Within six 
months of the foreclosure sale, the borrower may redeem the 
property by paying the foreclosure sale price plus interest.256 
Minnesota adopted sixteen foreclosure-related provisions in 
the period between January 2005 and May 2010, nine of which 
affected the pre-foreclosure process. Most of the provisions made 
small changes to existing law. The state is notable for failing to pass 
                                                            
248 Id. § 600.3205c(1); see also HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PRO-
GRAM, supra note 196, at §§ 1.1-1.2 (codifying eligibility criteria for a 
loan). 
249 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3205c(6) (2011). 
250 Id. § 600.3205c(7)(b). 
251 Id. § 600.3205c(8). 
252 Id. § 600.3205c(5)(a). 
253 S. 749, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008). 
254 MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2011).  
255 Id. § 580.041(1)(b); see also id. § 580.041(2) (stating the required 
content of every foreclosure advice notice). 
256 Id. § 580.23(1)(a); see also id. § 582.032 (abandoned residential property 
is subject to a shorter, five week redemption period). 
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optional mediation legislation in 2009, when the state legislature 
could not override Governor Tim Pawlenty’s veto.257 
One important provision was contained in 2008 House File 
3420, which requires notification to the borrower of available fore-
closure counseling services.258 The notice may be sent concurrently 
with the notice of default and must state that such services are 
available from authorized foreclosure counseling agencies and that 
the lender will transmit the borrower’s contact information to an 
approved agency within one week.259 If an authorized foreclosure 
prevention agency is in contact with a borrower, it must provide 
notice of such counseling assistance to the lender by way of a 
specified form.260 The lender must return this form within fifteen 
days along with the contact information for the agent authorized to 
discuss the terms of the mortgage and negotiate a resolution to the 
default.261 
Another important provision was contained in Senate File 
2559, which allows the borrower to postpone the foreclosure sale of a 
property classified as a homestead in exchange for agreeing to reduce 
the post-sale redemption period to five weeks.262 If the original 
redemption period was six months, the borrower can postpone the 
foreclosure sale by five months.263 If the original redemption period 
was twelve months, the borrower can postpone the sale for eleven 
months.264 This was intended to provide more time for the borrower 
to cure the default. 
Minnesota adopted other provisions that changed the fore-
closure process or content of the notices. Senate File 2918 allowed 
the post-sale redemption period for an abandoned property to be 
shortened from one year to five weeks.265 Sufficient evidence of 
abandonment must be included in the notice of pending foreclosure 
sale posted on the property.266 Senate File 1302 required the 
                                                            
257 NOW WE’RE TALKING, supra note 104, at 33. 
258 H.R. File 3420, 85th Leg. Sess., 2nd engrossment art. 5 § 7 (Minn. 
2008). 
259 MINN. STAT. § 580.021(2)-(3) (2011). 
260 Id. § 580.021(4). 
261 Id. 
262 S. File 2559, 86th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Minn. 2010). 
263 MINN. STAT. § 580.07(2)(a)(1) (2011). 
264 Id. § 580.07(2)(a)(2). 
265 S. File 2918, 85th Leg. Sess., 2nd Engrossment § 1 (Minn. 2008). 
266 MINN. STAT. § 582.032(6)-(7) (2011). 
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foreclosing lender to provide the borrower’s contact information to a 
foreclosure prevention agency.267 
Minnesota’s changes also favored the borrower. The most 
significant provisions required notification of modification opportu-
nities and allowed postponement of the foreclosure sale in exchange 
for a shortened redemption period. However, the state failed to pass 
mediation legislation to provide a more structured method to prevent 
foreclosures.  
 
E. Nevada 
 
In Nevada, lenders must file a notice of default that describes 
the deficiency with the county recorder.268 The foreclosure sale 
cannot occur until at least three months after the filing of the notice 
of default.269 After the three-month period expires, the lender must 
file a notice of the foreclosure sale stating its time and place.270 A 
copy of this notice must be provided to the borrower, posted in three 
public places for twenty consecutive days, and published once per 
week for three consecutive weeks in a local newspaper.271 A copy of 
the notice must be posted in a conspicuous place on the property no 
later than three business days after the notice of sale is recorded, and 
a separate notice must also be mailed to any tenant or subtenant 
within the same three-day period.272 
Nevada was a very active state during the study period and 
was the most active state during 2009 and the first five months of 
2010. From January 2005 to May 2010, the state adopted fifteen 
provisions regarding the foreclosure process, eleven of which 
directly affected the pre-foreclosure process. Nonetheless, the state 
may have reacted slowly, given the magnitude of its foreclosure 
problem. 
The most significant action was the creation of a foreclosure 
mediation program in 2009, the first in a nonjudicial foreclosure 
state.273 The state legislature and the Nevada Supreme Court 
                                                            
267 S. File 1302, 86th Leg. Sess., 3rd Engrossment § 4 (Minn. 2009).  
268 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(3)(a) (2011). 
269 Id. § 107.080(2)(d) . 
270 Id. § 107.080(4). 
271 S. 128, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Nev. 2009).  
272 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.087 (1)(a) (2011).  
273 See id. § 107.086(3)-(8) (providing that the debtor may elect to enter into 
a mediation and that each mediation must be conducted by a senior justice, 
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promulgated rules for the foreclosure mediation program.274 The 
authority to issue rules for the program was contained in Assembly 
Bill 149, which applies to any owner-occupied residential foreclosure 
and permits lenders and borrowers to exchange information and 
proposals to avoid foreclosure with the assistance of a mediator.275 
During mediation, the foreclosure process is suspended, and the 
lender can take no further action against the borrower.276 The Nevada 
Supreme Court rules state that mediation must take place within 135 
days after recording the notice of default.277 
The mediation program is mandatory if a homeowner 
requests it by completing the Election/Waiver of Mediation Form 
within thirty days after being served the notice of default.278 Failure 
to act within this prescribed time period waives the borrower’s right 
to mediation. 279The parties are entitled to a total of four hours for 
mediation280 and each must pay a $200 fee before entering the 
program.281 The lender must be represented by someone with the 
authority to modify the loan282 and must provide, prior to mediation, 
the original deed of trust, the note, documentation of each assignment 
of the deed of trust and note, and a recent appraisal.283 The lender’s 
representative must be physically present at the meetings unless the 
                                                            
judge, hearing master or other designee pursuant to the foreclosure 
mediation rules adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court). 
274 See generally id.; Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 1 (2011) (“Pursuant to 
the jurisdictional authority provided by Chapter 107 of the Nevada Revised 
Statutes and the Nevada Supreme Court’s inherent power to create rules for 
the efficient administration of justice, these rules are enacted to apply to the 
mediation of any owner-occupied residential foreclosure arising from the 
recording of a notice of default and election to sell on or after July 1, 
2009”). 
275 Assemb. 149, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Nev. 2009). 
276 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(3) (2011). 
277 Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 1 (2011). 
278 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(3) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 
1.3, 8 (2011). 
279 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(3) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 
8.4 (2011). 
280 Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 13.2 (2011). 
281 Id. R. 5, 6. 
282 Id. R. 10(a). 
283 Id. R. 11.3. 
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mediator determines otherwise.284 A party to mediation may file a 
petition for judicial review seeking a determination of bad faith 
participation and sanctions.285 Such petitions must be filed within 
thirty days of the date of the mediator’s statement and must be 
reviewed by the court within sixty days.286 
Other legislation made more modest changes to the fore-
closure process. Assembly Bill 65 was adopted to provide additional 
funding for the foreclosure mediation program by assessing a $50 fee 
for filing a notice of default and election to sell.287 Assembly Bill 140 
was passed in 2009 to protect and inform renters of foreclosed 
properties.288 Notices of default and of sale must be posted on the 
property and sent to the tenants along with information of their rights 
to remain in the unit or leave after the foreclosure sale.289 Senate Bill 
128 created new recording requirements for the foreclosure deed 
after a sale is executed.290 The lender must record it within thirty 
days of the sale or deliver it to the winning bidder within twenty 
days.291 The winning bidder must then record the sale within ten days 
of the bidding.292 
Nevada’s adopted provisions clearly favored the borrower. 
The mediation program was designed to provide alternatives to 
foreclosure by forcing lenders to negotiate modifications. While the 
required mediation fee may be a burden for some borrowers, many 
other aspects of the program provide a clear benefit to borrowers, 
such as requiring the lender to produce the original deed of trust, the 
mortgage note and documentation of each assignment. Other 
provisions adopted by the state offer better protection for renters or 
have a minimal impact on either party. 
 
  
                                                            
284 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(5) (2011); Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 
10.1(a) (2011). 
285 Nev. Foreclosure Mediation R. 21.1 (2011). 
286 Id. R. 21.2. 
287 Assemb. 65, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5.8 (Nev. 2009). 
288 See Assemb. 140, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3.2 (Nev. 2009) (criminalizing 
defacing a notice of foreclosure and establishing rights and duties of 
foreclosure sale purchasers and tenants in possession). 
289 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.087(3) (2011). 
290 See S. 128, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Nev. 2009) (requiring trustee to 
record sale within thirty days and sheriff to record sale within thirty days). 
291 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080(9)(a)-(b) (2011). 
292 Id. § 107.080(9)(b). 
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F. North Carolina 
 
North Carolina, like Colorado, has a foreclosure process that 
is a hybrid of nonjudicial and judicial processes. The lender must 
send the borrower a detailed statement of the amount of principal, 
interest, fees, expenses and disbursements claimed due as of the date 
of the statement.293 At least thirty days after sending this written 
statement, the lender must file notice of hearing with the clerk of 
court.294 At least ten days before the hearing, a notice specifying the 
time and place of the hearing must be served on the borrower.295 If 
the borrower cannot be personally served despite reasonable and 
diligent efforts, the notice may be posted in a conspicuous place on 
the property provided that it is posted at least twenty days before the 
date of the hearing.296 The hearing is held before the clerk of court 
who must find the existence of a valid debt, a default, a right to 
foreclose and the requisite notice before authorizing the lender to 
proceed.297 
Once authorized, the lender must give notice of the sale, 
which must provide the date, hour, and place of sale in addition to 
other information.298 The notice must be mailed at least twenty days 
prior to the date of sale to the borrower and to any occupants of a 
property of fewer than fifteen units.299 Notice of the sale must also be 
published weekly for at least two successive weeks in a local 
newspaper.300 Within five days after the sale, the foreclosing party 
must file a report of the foreclosure sale with the clerk of the superior 
court.301 
North Carolina adopted eleven provisions related to fore-
closures in the state, five of which changed the pre-foreclosure 
process. Several of the provisions created significant new procedures 
that extended the timeline by offering more opportunities to negotiate 
                                                            
293 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(c)(5a) (2011). 
294 Id. §§ 45-21.16(c)(5a), 45-21.16(a). 
295 Id. § 45-21.16(a). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. § 45-21.16(c)(7)(d). 
298 See id. § 45-21.16(a) (providing that the notice must contain a descrip-
tion of the property, state the terms of the sale, and provide certain statutory 
notices regarding rights of possession and the tenants’ right to terminate the 
lease). 
299 Id. § 45-21.17(4). 
300 Id. § 45-21.17(1)(b)(1), (2)(b). 
301 Id. § 45-21.26(a). 
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a loan modification. Enacted in 2008, House Bill 2623 stated that at 
least forty-five days prior to the filing of a notice of hearing in a 
foreclosure proceeding for a primary residence, lenders and servicers 
of subprime loans must send written notice by mail to the borrower 
to inform him of the availability of resources to avoid foreclosure.302 
This notice must include an itemization of all past due amounts 
causing the loan to be in default, an itemization of any other charges 
that must be paid in order to bring the loan current, a statement 
regarding negotiation and foreclosure counseling options, and the 
contact information for the party who is authorized to work with the 
borrower to avoid foreclosure.303 
House Bill 2623 also established the State Home Foreclosure 
Prevention Project, which empowered the Commissioner of Banks to 
evaluate subprime loans to determine which were most suitable for 
foreclosure prevention efforts.304 To provide more time for mediation 
and loan modification efforts, the Commissioner could extend the 
allowable filing date for any subprime foreclosure proceeding by up 
to thirty days beyond the earliest filing date established by the pre-
foreclosure notice.305 
Senate Bill 974, adopted in 2009,306 gave more power to the 
clerk of courts during the pre-foreclosure hearing. Specifically, the 
clerk can inquire into efforts the lender has made to communicate 
with the debtor to resolve the matter voluntarily before the fore-
closure proceeding.307 For owner-occupied homes, the clerk must 
order the hearing continued up to sixty days if he finds that there is 
good cause to believe that additional time or measures have a reason-
able likelihood of resolving the delinquency without foreclosure.308 
The clerk could base this decision on the quality of communication 
between the two parties, whether the borrower had the intent and 
ability to resolve the delinquency after a modification, or whether the 
lender had offered appropriate resolution options such as forbearance 
and loan modification.309 
                                                            
302 Emergency Program to Reduce Home Foreclosures, H.R. 2623, 2008 
N.C. Sess. Laws 226 § 1 (2008). 
303 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-102 (2011). 
304 H.R. 2623, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 226 § 1. 
305 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-105 (2011). 
306 S. 974, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 974. 
307 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16C(a) (2011). 
308 Id. § 45-21.16C(b). 
309 Id.  
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A third provision extended deficiency judgment protections 
to a wider class of mortgages. House Bill 1057 prohibited deficiency 
judgments on any owner-occupied residential loans originated or 
modified on or after January 1, 2005, if the loan is subject to negative 
amortization or permits deferred payments of principal or interest.310 
These loans must also conform to the standards published by Fannie 
Mae.311 
North Carolina’s actions favored the borrower. They created 
the opportunity to extend the pre-foreclosure timeline by up to sixty 
days for many owner-occupied properties and focused on protecting 
subprime borrowers. Legislation also offered certain borrowers 
greater protection from deficiency judgments. 
 
G. Oregon 
 
Upon default by the borrower, an Oregon lender must file a 
notice of default in the county clerk’s office.312 After recording the 
notice of default at least 120 days before the foreclosure sale, a 
notice of sale must be served upon or mailed to the borrower.313 The 
notice of sale must name all the parties to the trust deed, describe the 
property, state the default and the amount owed, and set forth the 
date, time and place of sale.314 A notice must be addressed to each 
residential tenant as well, and should include information regarding 
his or her rights and tenancy.315Finally, a copy of the notice of sale 
must be published in a newspaper in each of the counties in which 
the property is situated once per week for four successive weeks.316 
On the tenth day after the foreclosure sale, the purchaser is entitled to 
possession of the premises.317 
Oregon adopted twelve foreclosure-related provisions 
between January 2005 and May 2010, mostly towards the end of the 
                                                            
310 H.R.1057, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 441§ 1. 
311 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38A(a)(3) (2011). 
312 OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735(3) (2009). 
313 Id. § 86.740(1) (providing that notice may be requested by any person by 
filing a request for a copy of any notice of sale or default); id § 86.785 (pro-
viding that such request must be recorded after the trust deed was recorded 
and before notice of default was recorded).  
314 Id. §§ 86.745(1)-(7).  
315 Id. § 86.745(9). 
316 Id. § 86.750(2). 
317 Id. § 86.755(5)(a) (2009). 
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study period. Seven of these affected the pre-foreclosure process. 
Senate Bill 628 required that a form to request a loan modification be 
sent with or before the notice of sale.318 The borrower must return the 
form within thirty days of receiving it to qualify for a loan modifica-
tion.319 Once the lender receives the completed form, it has forty-five 
days to determine the borrower’s eligibility based on information 
relayed in the form, such as income and expenses.320 The lender may 
also request additional information from the borrower.321 During this 
period, the foreclosure process is suspended and the borrower can 
request a meeting to discuss loan modification options.322 If 
requested, this meeting must include a representative of the lender 
authorized to modify the loan terms.323 House Bill 3610 adds a 
requirement that borrowers who are denied a modification must be 
informed as to why they were not eligible.324 It is worth noting, how-
ever, that these loan modification review and meeting requirements 
are currently set to expire January 2, 2012.325 
Senate Bill 239 gave certain rights to borrowers who did not 
receive timely notice of the foreclosure sale.326 If the borrower did 
not receive the notice prior to twenty-five days before the sale took 
place, then the borrower retained the same rights as a junior lien 
holder that was not joined in a judicial foreclosure filing.327 Senate 
Bill 301 provided alternative ways to meet the requirement to serve 
notice of sale to interested parties.328 If diligent efforts were unsuc-
cessful, the law allowed the notice to be conspicuously posted on the 
property and then mailed to the last known address of the interested 
parties.329 House Bill 2980 stated that a notice of sale becomes 
effective as of the date it was mailed.330 
                                                            
318 S. 628, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Or. 2009). 
319 Id.  
320 S. 628, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Or. 2009). 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
324 H.R. 3610, 75th Leg. Assemb., Spec. Sess. § 1 (Or. 2010). 
325 OR. REV. STAT. § 86.737 note (2009).  
326 S. 239, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Or. 2009). 
327 Id.  
328 See S. 301, 74th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Or. 2007) (permitting 
lenders to, inter alia, post notice if personal service cannot be effected).  
329 Id. 
330 H.R. 2980, 73rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(2) (Or. 2005).  
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Oregon’s adopted provisions generally favored the borrower. 
Senate Bill 628 and House Bill 3610, in particular, were intended to 
offer the borrower an alternative to foreclosure and a way to keep 
lenders accountable in their efforts. Other provisions protect 
borrower rights if proper notice is not served. 
 
H. Washington 
 
In Washington, notice of default must be sent by the lender 
to the borrower at her last known address.331 Notice must also be 
either posted in a conspicuous place on the premises or served 
personally on the borrower.332 The notice must contain a description 
of the property, a statement of the default, an account of any amounts 
in arrears and an explanation of the effect of foreclosure.333 At least 
ninety days before the sale, the lender must record the notice of sale 
in the office of the county auditor.334 The notice of sale must be sent 
to the borrower and any occupants of the property and must provide 
the date and time of the sale, describe the default, list any cure 
amount and the deadline to cure, explain the effect of the sale and 
provide contact information for the lender.335 The notice of sale must 
also be published in a local newspaper, once between the thirty-fifth 
and twenty-eighth day before the date of sale, and once between the 
fourteenth and seventh day before the sale.336 The sale may not occur 
less than 190 days after the date of default or less than ninety days 
after the recording of the notice of sale.337 On the date and at the time 
set for the sale, the lender must sell the property at public auction to 
the highest bidder.338 The sale is final as of the time the lender 
accepts a bid, so long as the deed is recorded within fifteen days.339 
The lender or other winning bidder is entitled to possession of the 
                                                            
331 WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.030(8) (2011); see also id. § 61.24.031 
(requiring that written notice of default must be transmitted at least thirty 
days before notice of sale may be recorded and such notice of default may 
not be transmitted until at least thirty days after initial contact with the 
borrower has been made). 
332 Id. § 61.24.030(8). 
333 Id. § 61.24.030(8)(a)-(l). 
334 Id. § 61.24.040(1)(a). 
335 Id. § 61.24.040(f). 
336 Id. § 61.24.040(3). 
337 Id. §§ 61.24.040(8), 61.24.040(1)(a). 
338 Id. § 61.24.040(4). 
339 Id. § 61.24.050. 
2011-2012 RESPONSES TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 407 
property on the twentieth day following the sale.340The purchaser of 
tenant-occupied property must provide written notice to the 
occupants and tenants.341 The tenant in possession must be given 
sixty days’ written notice to vacate.342 
Washington adopted eight provisions concerning foreclosure 
procedures, seven of which affected the pre-foreclosure process. 
Senate Bill 5810 created special requirements for owner-occupied 
loans made between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2007.343 
Upon default, the lender must contact the borrower to ascertain her 
ability to repay the loan and discuss options for avoiding fore-
closure.344 The borrower has a right to request a subsequent meeting 
with the beneficiary, which must occur within fourteen days of the 
request and which may occur telephonically.345 In addition, the notice 
of default must indicate that this required first contact with the 
borrower occurred or that the beneficiary tried with due diligence to 
contact the borrower but was unsuccessful.346 
Senate Bill 6711 was adopted in 2008 to create the Smart 
Homeownership Choices Program, which was modified a year later 
by Senate Bill 6033 to become the Prevent or Reduce Owner-
Occupied Foreclosure Program.347 This program is intended to assist 
homeowners facing foreclosure by pursuing loan workouts and 
modifications.348 The program targets borrowers that are making less 
than 140% of the county median income.349 Attorneys, mortgage 
brokers, housing counselors and other relevant housing professionals 
volunteer with the program to provide advice to at-risk borrowers.350 
While not as active as other states, Washington took some 
modest steps to shift the foreclosure process slightly in favor of the 
borrower. However, the principal measures only impacted a certain 
subset of mortgage foreclosures or were temporary in nature.  
 
                                                            
340 Id. § 61.24.060(1). 
341 Id. § 61.24.060(2)-(3). 
342 Id. § 61.24.146(1). 
343 S. 5810, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 2009). 
344 WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.031(1)(b) (2011).  
345 Id. § 61.24.031(1)(c). 
346 Id. § 61.24.031(5). 
347 S. 6033, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009) modifying S. 6711, 60th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). 
348 WASH. REV. CODE § 43.320.160(1) (2011). 
349 Id. 
350 Id. § 43.320.160(3). 
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VI. Analysis 
 
Overall, legislatures in nonjudicial states adopted a substan-
tial number of changes to foreclosure law, especially as the national 
foreclosure crisis swelled in 2008 and 2009. The states adopted 
almost two hundred substantive provisions that concern mortgage 
default, servicing and foreclosure processes between January 2005 
and May 2010. In particular, there was a significant increase in 
legislative activity from 2006 through 2009. During that period, the 
number of adopted provisions increased from just twelve in 2006 to 
seventy in 2009. The majority of this increased activity concerned 
pre-foreclosure-sale processes, while smaller shares of activity con-
cerned foreclosure sale and post-sale processes, servicer regulation 
and ancillary issues.  
There was considerable variation in the level of legislative 
activity across states. Some states passed no laws with substantive 
provisions during the study period while others passed laws with ten 
to twenty substantive provisions. Three states accounted for twenty-
five percent of the adopted provisions, and ten states accounted for 
sixty percent. In general, states with the highest foreclosure rate 
during the second half of 2007 and all of 2008 (e.g., Arizona, 
California and Nevada) adopted the greatest number of provisions 
during 2009 and the first five months of 2010. States with very low 
levels of foreclosures (e.g., Alaska, Montana and Wyoming) saw no 
legislative activity. However, among states with relatively moderate 
levels of foreclosures there was a substantial variation in legislative 
activity. Some (e.g., Idaho and Virginia) saw only one or two 
provisions adopted during the latter period while others (e.g., Oregon 
and Colorado) saw seven or eight provisions adopted. Moreover, 
there were a few states (Georgia, Mississippi and Rhode Island) that 
had moderately high foreclosure levels but very small amounts of 
legislative activity. Consequently, it appears that other characteristics 
besides a state’s level of foreclosures, such as its political 
environment or preexisting foreclosure law, were also important 
determinants of legislative activity. 
A closer examination of the nature of the changes in fore-
closure law in eight legislatively active states shows that there were 
some commonalities in the changes made in state foreclosure law. As 
expected, the adopted changes were largely in favor of the borrower. 
Most of these changes occurred during 2008 and 2009, a time when 
policymakers were under significant pressure to respond to the local 
and national foreclosure crisis. At the same time, many of the 
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changes would have to be considered quite marginal. Many involved 
small changes in notice periods or directions to lenders and servicers 
to take particular steps, some of which they may already have been 
doing.  
Some of the provisions concerning the pre-foreclosure 
process were components of larger efforts to increase opportunities 
for loan modifications. Relatively few of these efforts involved third-
party mediation. More focused on longer notice-to-sale periods, but 
also on additional notices, connections to hotlines and housing 
counselors, and related procedures. Notably, only Colorado351 passed 
a law that reduced the notice-to-sale period. It is important to note, 
however, that most nonjudicial states already had relatively brief pre-
foreclosure periods, especially compared to most judicial states. 
Few states passed legislation addressing issues of the details 
of the foreclosure sale itself, such as minimum bid requirements, the 
availability of deficiency judgments, or other issues. Moreover, no 
nonjudicial state made a substantial move to adopt a judicial fore-
closure process. 
Some states with substantial post-sale redemption periods 
(Michigan and Minnesota) did move towards either shortening these 
periods for abandoned properties or essentially converting post-sale 
redemption time into presale notice time. 
Given the time period of our study, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that very little legislative activity concerned the regulation of 
the servicers and processes that would directly address the loan and 
mortgage documentation issues that have recently become so well 
understood. While the increased media attention will likely spur 
increased attention to these issues, nonjudicial states paid little 
attention to these problems prior to the summer of 2010. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This study shows that significant numbers of nonjudicial 
foreclosure states did take some steps to try to reduce foreclosures, 
including changes in foreclosure law. Moreover, some of the more 
legislatively active states took steps to make the foreclosure process 
favor borrowers more than it had before the crisis. However, many of 
these provisions constituted quite marginal changes; many were 
temporary measures aimed only at loans originated during the 
subprime boom and others were effectively redundant with federal 
                                                            
351 See supra notes 160, 164 and accompanying text. 
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foreclosure mitigation efforts. Furthermore, in many nonjudicial 
states, there was little substantive legislative response, even in the 
face of a national foreclosure crisis. In some states, this is at least 
partly explained by the fact that the state was not hit very hard by the 
foreclosure crisis. However, some states with high rates of 
foreclosure during this period did little to change their foreclosure 
processes.  
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